A New Start for EU Peacemaking?

Past Record and Future Potential

The Lisbon Treaty has equipped the European Union with more tools in the field of foreign and security policy and provides for a new beginning for Europe in international peacemaking. In this report a team of researchers at the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) of the Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, demonstrates that there is a need for such a new start. In the documentation of EU engagement in international affairs, the report finds the record to be below expectations. The report also asserts that there is a potential for the EU to take on a more significant international role.

The report recommends that the EU should refocus its international conflict activity to constructive engagements for peace and security; make more use of, and develop, its crisis management capacities; and strengthen its performance in peacekeeping. These dimensions of peacebuilding should be integrated into a new doctrine of international conflict resolution, firmly rested on the values expressed in the Lisbon Treaty. Furthermore, the EU should emphasise its role as a leading force for human rights and democracy by making its actions more effective; draw on the competence of the entire Union; and make its goals clearer and increase its visibility when cooperating with other international bodies.

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About the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP)

The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) collects information on a large number of aspects of armed violence after 1946. Since the 1970s, the UCDP has recorded ongoing violent conflicts. This effort continues to the present day, now coupled with the collection of information on an ever broadening scope of aspects pertaining to organised violence, such as the resolution and dynamics of conflict. The UCDP data is one of the most accurate and well-used data-sources on global armed conflicts and its definition of armed conflict is becoming a standard in how conflicts are systematically conceptualised and studied. Data on armed conflicts has been published yearly in the report series States in Armed Conflict since 1987, in the SIPRI Yearbook since 1988, the Journal of Peace Research since 1993 and in the Human Security Report since 2005. In addition, UCDP researchers conduct theoretically and empirically based analyses of armed conflict: its causes, escalation, spread, prevention and resolution. These studies are regularly featured in international journals and books.

In this report, information regarding the EU's activity is drawn from several UCDP data projects but it also presents some uniquely collected data. More details about coding rules and definitions for specific data collection efforts are available in the free online database (www.ucdp.uu.se/database).

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A New Start for the EU in International Peacemaking?

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Lisbon Treaty has now equipped the European Union with more tools and instruments in the field of external affairs, foreign and security policy. This can provide for a new start for European involvement in international peacemaking. The creation of the new High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (Ms Ashton being the first in this new post) demonstrates this and the creation of a new European External Action Service (EEAS) generates a capacity to implement a new start. It is important that international conflict resolution is integrated in the EEAS mandate from the beginning.

In this report a team of researchers at the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) of the Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden, demonstrates *that there is a need for such a new start. In the documentation of EU engagement in international affairs, the report finds the record to be below expectations. The report also asserts that there is a potential for the EU to take on a more significant international role.*

These conclusions are based on a unique inventory of EU participation in armed conflict, peacemaking, third party action, mediation, human rights, democracy building and sanctions, available in the freely accessible UCDP conflict database (www.ucdp.uu.se/database). By doing so, the report demonstrates that systematic data is available and that it is possible to compare the organisation's activities over time, around the globe and in different areas of concern. Thus, the conclusions and recommendations in this paper are based on the actual activities of the EU in particular conflict situations, not simply on EU meetings or resolutions. The EU claims that its activities are guided by two basic goals: issues of international peace and security as well as the promotion of human rights and democracy. These two issue-areas have therefore been chosen as the focus for the empirical assessment of EU action in this report.

This executive summary brings together pertinent conclusions that are of relevance at this moment of birth for a new EU foreign policy. The departure point is the values and goals that the EU itself has agreed on. This is compared to activities in fields of peace and security on the one hand, and human rights and democracy on the other. For both these fields the report searches for the special EU profile, and asks, in particular, if the EU has been a leading, rather than supportive, actor in its efforts. The report also attempts to evaluate the effectiveness of EU actions so far and draws a set of practical conclusions.

EU values and instruments

The Lisbon Treaty makes clear the values on which the EU and its foreign policy is to operate. This report is concerned with those that affect the new High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy. The values are not only peace and security for the Union itself but also the promotion of values around the world. Article 3.5 mentions peace, security, sustainability, solidarity, mutual respect, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty, protection of human and child rights, international law and the principles of the UN Charter (also Article 21).

The Treaty also specifies that the High Representative "shall conduct the Union's common foreign and security policy", contribute proposals and carry out decisions of the Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Council, which the High Representative also chairs (Article 18). Particularly significant is the creation of an extensive external action staff (Article 27). Together this provides a European-wide agreed basis for an international significant peacemaking role. What then is the record so far and what is needed to fulfil these ambitions?

The EU in peacemaking: Surprisingly weak performance

The Treaty mentions a gradual deepening of cooperation in the international fields, including security cooperation. Clearly, the perspective is one of dealing with challenges in a peaceful way. There is, for instance, no paragraph giving the EU the right to declare war, a fact that seems to reflect the EU's self-image as a civilian power.

This commitment to peaceful action contrasts the finding in this report that one area where EU members have intensified their activity over

the past decades consists of sending troops into wars. Obviously, this is not done in the name of the EU as a collective body, but the deepening security and foreign policy coordination makes the distinction increasingly unclear in practical terms. One example is the EU involvement in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF); the UN authorised security force in Afghanistan. In fact, 25 out of 27 members have been involved in this war as of the end of 2009. This operation is basically under the framework of NATO, whether countries are member of that organisation or not. The involvement in Afghanistan is often motivated by the need to counter threats from international terrorists. Certainly, the Lisbon Treaty specifies the support of third countries in combating terrorism as one of the main concerns of the Union (Article 43), and several member states have experienced terrorist deeds. However, one may ask if this strong military involvement actually is what the treaty makers and the European population had in mind. This emerges even more clearly when the ambitious military commitment is contrasted with the comparatively small EU civil police operation in Afghanistan.

Furthermore, the data shows that several member states have been involved in other serious armed conflicts as well, notably the UK (Gulf War 1991 and Iraq since 2003, Northern Ireland, and Sierra Leone 2000). Several other countries have similar records: Spain (in the same international wars as Britain and in the Basque conflict), and France (a warring party in Iraq in 1991, but not in 2003, and with interventions in Africa). As these are leading members of the Union, and as so many are involved in the war in Afghanistan, *a first problem for the new High Representative will have to be to reconcile this armed engagement with the overall peaceful ambitions of the Union.*

However, the report also notes that the EU or EU member states seldom takes a lead role in these armed conflicts. Even in the most severe conflicts, they have mostly been supportive parties, supplying forces for an operation de facto decided on elsewhere. Still, the EU is committed in ways which definitely involves its member states. For instance in the EU-Afghanistan Joint Declaration of November 16, 2009 it says that "EU Member States shall continue their substantial role in supplying military and civilian resources to the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force…" These types of

engagements in armed conflict complicate the EU's image, blur the distinction between the EU and its member states and *may, the report fears, have effects on the EU's possibilities of performing peaceful peacemaking roles.*

The EU as third party

The overview of the EU and EU member states as third parties does not indicate a strong consistent engagement or a pattern of rising activity. A third party is an actor who helps the warring sides regulate their incompatibility or the level of the violence and acts as an intermediary between the two. The EU is engaged in a few conflicts every year, but such engagement has been less intensive in the last ten years. In many central conflicts, the EU and its member states played a more significant role earlier than the organisation does today. In the 1990s, the EU was a lead third party actor in the Balkan conflicts. There is no corresponding collective commitment since then. The report finds that individual EU member states have played such roles, with an informal connection to the EU collectivity. For instance, former President of Finland Martti Ahtisaari operated through an NGO in Aceh in 2005, but could use the EU network for the implementation of the agreement. The report finds the EU as such to be prominent in a few instances in the last ten years, notably in Macedonia in 2001 (under the Swedish presidency of the time). Indeed, this is a case where the EU as a third party actually was the lead external actor in bringing about a lasting peace agreement (the Ohrid Agreement 2001). A second case is the Georgia (South Ossetia) conflict in 2008, where the French presidency was instrumental in reaching a ceasefire. However, there is still no solution to the conflict.

The case of Georgia also illustrates a broadening geographical scope of EU activity, from a focus on the near neighbourhood to a larger arena of former-Soviet Union states, as well as to Africa, Asia and South America. The danger is, then, that the organisation will not be able to concentrate on a particular area. However, the data on early *crisis management measures* in intra-state conflicts presented in the report (Box B) shows a heavy EU concentration on a few conflicts, mainly in its vicinity. It is also noted that the EU primarily has focused on influencing the policies of the government side, in a way an extension of the EU itself being a governmental body. The report

finds that this approach seems to play to the strengths of EU capability and that civilian crisis management has the potential to be an avenue for increased EU peacemaking activity.

Another important development is that the EU now more easily can appoint *Special Representatives* following the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty. These positions are not a recent introduction; the EU already had such representatives for a host of conflicts and regions. However, it is surprising to find that they seldom appear in international reporting from these conflicts or regions as particularly important or active third parties. Their activities may have to be made more known. There might also be good reasons to review how such representatives are appointed and what mandates they are given. To get to a standing similar to the ones of the UN Special Representatives will require more resources for these positions. The report also notes that *so far no women have been appointed* to any such positions, which makes the report wonder how the nomination and appointment procedure is done. It is not necessary to remind the decision-makers that women are affected by the wars and conflicts in ways which are different from those of men and that women, consequently, can add significant dimensions for building a peaceful future.

The report notes that the EU has set up a number of *new peace operations*. Those missions that deal with active conflict situations are often very small, spread over a number of conflicts, and often have very specified mandates. The specification of mandates adds to efficiency. However, the report finds that the mandates *largely deal with matters on the side of the central political disagreements*. This approach may not be insignificant, but it is far from the idea of the EU as a promoter of peace processes globally or even in its own neighbourhood. The missions do rarely meet the global UCDP definitions of third party activity for conflict resolution. Also EU operations in this period have normally had one country as an agenda-setting, "framework" actor (notably France in Chad), thus in practice not necessarily reflecting the organisation as a whole.

The number of EU *peacekeepers* is still limited. Those with stronger mandates are few. The competence of the armed forces of EU member states may lead observers to expect more optimal performance (in

mandates, equipment, action) than, for instance, from the UN. Since 2003, the missions are more numerous, but have a civilian emphasis, or a reconstruction role after conflict. They could be described as peacebuilders rather than peacekeepers.

The data points out that *the EU has, in fact, seldom been the leading actor even in third party missions*. It has followed other initiatives or preferred to find less controversial roles. It means that it often acts as a supportive, not a leading third party. EU expertise and ambitions could make the EU a much stronger actor.

The report summarises EU engagement for international peace and security as a contradictory one. On the one hand there is an increase in member states' engagement in military operations, notably in Afghanistan. On the other hand there are a number of small-scale missions in more peaceful pursuit of action, particularly with respect to African situations. This could mean that the potential of very considerable EU efforts for peacemaking in fact may be consumed by the costly and complicated military engagements, which are likely to take priority. Thus, the report *asks if* there is a correlation, in the sense that *the heavy member state activity in Afghanistan and in combating terrorism in fact has an overburdening and out-crowding effect* on other types of EU initiatives. The report concludes that it is imperative for the new High Representative to be alert to such effects and make sure *unequivocal and comparable attention is given to peaceful peacemaking*. To formulate such a role for the European Security and Defence Policy now that it enters its second decade and even is renamed as the Common Security and Defence Policy seems imperative.

The EU's strength: human rights and democracy
This contrasts the report's other field of study: human rights and democracy. More than any other this is the area where the EU is taking a leading role internationally. These goals have a prominent place in the Lisbon Treaty. The report observes the following:

The EU increasingly uses *sanctions* to complement the UN: the EU takes up issues that the UN is blocked from dealing with. Notable cases are Burma/Myanmar and Zimbabwe but also Belarus and Uzbekistan.

Without EU action, it is unlikely that, for instance, the situation in Zimbabwe would have been so closely observed internationally as is now the case. The forces for forgetting or minimising such an issue are strong. On this score the EU has displayed unwavering unanimity.

The report also observes that the EU has made human rights the cornerstone of its external relations by systematically including human rights clauses in its *agreements with third countries*. On the one hand, the EU contributes to the promotion of human rights worldwide and makes it clear that it is willing to be partner only with those countries which respect democratic principles and human rights. On the other hand, so far the EU's application of human rights clauses has been quite limited in scope and lacks consistency. In contrast, *membership conditionality* has been a quite successful tool in bringing positive changes within human rights and democracy fields in the candidate states. Whereas institutional and legal changes are faster and easier to observe, changes in political culture and behaviour seem to be lagging behind. On the whole, however, the report finds that the EU is living up to its own values by giving human rights priority treatment, and in that way promoting democracy.

When are EU measures effective?
The report attempts some first statistical analyses of the impact of EU measures. The results are tentative but worth considering. A positive finding is that the EU has largely been successful in brokering peace and helping to end conflicts, emphasising the potential of all-European efforts to provide a more peaceful world. However, EU measures have largely been ineffective in preventing human rights violations, domestic military involvement in politics, or the outbreak of conflict: areas where it has been assumed that the EU has a competitive edge over other actors. Particularly disappointing is the finding that EU sanctions in fact increase the likelihood of coup attempts and severe human rights violations by a government.

This suggests that there is a need for the EU to reassess how, when and why its measures are employed to improve their effectiveness. Sanctions are a powerful tool but only if designed to have the most impact on the targets without affecting the innocent, while clearly indicating what the target has to do to remove the sanctions. It is

evident that the EU prefers consultation in the event of breeches of human rights conditionality clauses, which means that *the willingness to use costly rather than symbolic measures to protect human rights is limited*.

However, it should not be forgotten that when the EU has become actively involved as a third party *promoting peace agreements, the results have been quite successful*. As the report finds that this type of activity has waned over time, the statistical analysis serves as a powerful reminder about the unfulfilled potential of the EU. It can play a role in peaceful endings of conflict, and, in addition, in post-conflict peacebuilding.

Towards an EU peacebuilding doctrine?
The EU's present doctrines do not connect the two aspects of peace and security on the one hand and human rights & democracy on the other. How does democracy and human rights relate to peace? There are obvious connections. The work for human rights and democracy can be seen as part of peacebuilding, which is important in post-conflict situations to forestall a return to war. It is also a significant preventive measure. It is important to prevent countries from falling (back) into conflict. The EU could start with societies at risk and stimulate them to opening up for civil society. Thus, if combined these goals would give a role for the EU in the promotion of peacebuilding both as a preventive and as a curative measure.

The report gives support for the High Representative to develop *a new doctrine for the EU's foreign and security policy*. It needs to move beyond the strategic doctrine of 2003. It should incorporate actual EU experiences in promoting different dimensions of peace and security. Such a public document from the new High Representative could assertively make clear that the EU is a primary actor for peace, not just a supportive actor in the footsteps of others. The EU has the potential in term of values, knowledge and resources. Indeed the values expressed in the Lisbon Treaty make EU citizens and the world public expect such a role. It has a pool of insight and competence to draw from, not only from diplomacy, armed forces and politics, but also academia, civil society and not the least, women. And, indeed, the conflict in

Afghanistan may be a place where the EU could start to chisel out such a role for itself by making use of its third party potential.

In general, this report finds that:

1. There is a need to refocus Europe's international conflict activity to constructive engagements for peace and security.

2. The EU needs to make more use of, and develop, its crisis management capacities.

3. The EU needs to strengthen the role of the EU Special Representatives.

4. ESDP/CSDP operations need to increase their weight in conflict resolution and peacekeeping.

5. The EU needs to emphasise its role as a leading force for human rights and democracy by making its actions more effective.

6. The EU needs to draw on the competence of the entire Union.

7. The EU needs to integrate peace dimensions into a new doctrine of peaceful conflict resolution and peacebuilding, firmly rested on the values expressed in the Lisbon Treaty.

8. The EU needs to make its goals clearer and increase its visibility when cooperating with other international bodies for international peace (e.g. UN; OSCE; AU).

1. Introduction

In the European Security Strategy adopted in late 2003, it is boldly declared that the European Union "should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world" (Council of the European Union 2003: 1). Indeed, the EU had already before the adoption of a common strategic policy explored different measures with the intent of resolving, managing, and preventing armed conflict worldwide. It has been argued that the EU has increasingly developed an international presence within this field, and also that the types of measures employed have diversified and focused on an expanding geographical sphere of influence. The recently adopted Lisbon Treaty indicates that this continues to be an area of growing importance for the EU. Notable is the creation of a High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy who will serve as Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Council and Vice-President of the European Commission and is intended to represent the EU in all aspects of external action. In addition, the European External Actions Service under direct authority of the High Representative is supposed to assist the High Representative and play a central role in the strategic decision-making in this field with the ambition of further strengthening the EU's ability to act decisively.

In particular, the promotion of democracy and human rights has been a cornerstone of EU joint action as the common foreign policy has evolved. Already the 1973 Copenhagen Declaration promoted common values such as the respect of human rights as central for further European Political Cooperation (King 1999). This approach is reiterated in recent strategic documents covering guidelines and policies for development, security, sanctions, and inter-regional relations (European Commission 2000, 2001, 2004; Council of the European Union 2004b). Indeed the Treaty on European Union (TEU) specifically mentions that the Union's "relations with the wider world" are committed to "the eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights (…) as well as to the strict observance and the development of international law, including respect of the United Nations Charter" (Bassot et al. 2009).

That said, there is little scrutiny of the track record of the EU and its member states in the field of peace and conflict. This paper provides an overview of EU activity as a conflict actor and as a peacemaking actor, and its willingness to respond to human rights violations. In contrast to earlier studies that have focused exclusively on the instances where the EU has a presence, this paper explores all countries in the world that experience conflict, bad governance, or severe human rights violations and then identify whether the EU is involved and, if so, in what way. Most of the information presented has been collected by different projects within the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University. The UCDP has been collecting information on armed conflicts and peacemaking efforts for over 30 years and maintains a free online database where the information is presented (www.ucdp.uu.se/database.)

The report will first examine the role the EU has played in armed conflict and as a peacemaker. After describing EU involvement as a warring or supporting party in armed conflict, a nuanced view of different third party activities – both as defined by the UCDP and in a broader sense – will be provided. Next, the report examines EU tools for promoting democracy and human rights, notably sanctions as well as the offer of incentives in membership negotiations and agreements with third countries. We then proceed to examine to what extent the EU's activities in these fields – peace, democracy and human rights – have succeeded. Lastly, the report concludes with some recommendations for EU foreign policy in a new era.

2. EU activity in the sphere of peace and security

2.1 EU in armed conflict

The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) has compiled systematic data on all armed conflicts that have taken place since the end of the Second World War.[1] Even though the data shows a temporary sudden increase in conflict following the end of the Cold War, the last 15 years have seen a dramatic decline in the number of ongoing armed conflicts worldwide. In 2008, there were 36 active armed conflicts in the world, which is only two-thirds of the total for the peak year 1992 (Harbom & Wallensteen 2009). These 36 conflicts were located in 26 different countries, of which only two were in Europe (Russia and Georgia).[2]

Graph 1. Armed Conflicts, 1946-2008

The European Union as an actor has not been involved as a primary or secondary party in any armed conflicts,[3] as policies regarding the internal security of the member states have primarily been outside the

1 The UCDP defines an armed conflict as a contested incompatibility that concerns government or territory or both where the use of armed force between two parties results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a year. Of these two parties, at least one has to be the government of a state (cf. Gleditsch et al. 2002).

2 For a full list of the conflicts active in 2008, see Appendix I.

3 According to UCDP, primary parties are those directly contesting the incompatibility, while secondary parties assist either side with active warring support or other forms of support.

scope of the organisation. However, the Lisbon Treaty introduces a mutual assistance clause (42.7), whereby member states are obliged to assist another member states in the event of armed aggression on its territory.

Using UCDP data, it is possible to explore in what way EU member states have been involved in armed conflict. As was mentioned, Europe as a region has been largely spared from armed conflict in recent years. There have been two active conflicts in EU member states during the 1989-2008 time period, in Spain against the Basque separatists and in the United Kingdom over the territory of Northern Ireland. Even though ETA remains occasionally active in Spain, the violence has not reached the UCDP threshold for inclusion as an armed conflict since 1992. In this conflict, the Spanish government received intelligence support from France. The conflict in Northern Ireland briefly flared up again in 1998 but has since been inactive, and the successful peace process indicates that there is little risk for a resumption of violent separatism there.

Box A: EU and Cyprus – conflict and accession

As we have seen, there were only two active conflicts on EU territory in the 1989-2008 period. Although the conflict on Cyprus has not been active in that period, efforts to achieve a final solution to that conflict have taken place, with the EU playing a major role. The unresolved conflict was in 2004 incorporated into the EU territory; EU member Greece and prospective member Turkey have been involved in the conflict; and the EU as an organisation has attempted to aid in the resolution of the conflict.

The Cyprus conflict has its origins before the island's independence in 1960, and arrangements for power sharing and minority rights failed to ease tensions between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. In 1974, the National Guard carried out a coup and sought to unite Cyprus with Greece. These events triggered military intervention by Turkey, precipitating an armed conflict which left the island divided between the Greek Cypriot south and the Turkish Cypriot north. Despite an end to violence, attempts to achieve a final resolution to the conflict and a reunification of Cyprus have failed. The Turkish Cypriot area declared itself independent in 1983, but was only recognised by Turkey (ICG 2006).

The Greek Cypriot administration submitted an application for EU membership in 1990. The EU from the outset posited that membership needed to coincide with a resolution of the conflict (European Commission 1993). However, as negotiations continued it became clear that an agreement would not be a necessary precondition. This may partly be due to the fact that at this time, it was the Turkish Cypriot side that appeared to be most firmly opposed to reunification. Furthermore, Greece was in a position to prevent the conclusion of EU's eastern enlargement if Cyprus was not accepted. In 2002, the

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Box A: Continued

UN tabled a peace process proposal – the Annan Plan – envisaging a federal solution for Cyprus, closely tied to its accession and integration into the EU (ICG 2006). Shortly before the date for Cyprus' accession, referenda on a revised Annan Plan including reunification were held in both parts of the island on 24 April 2004. While the Turkish Cypriot community yielded a 65% "yes" vote, a large majority of the Greek Cypriots rejected the plan. On 1 May, therefore, a still divided Cyprus acceded to the EU.[4]

While the prospect of EU membership appears to have made the Turkish Cypriot community more willing to accept reunification, the fact that an agreement was not a precondition for accession seems to be an important explanatory factor for the Greek Cypriot rejection of the peace plan.[5] Although EU membership failed to resolve the conflict, the EU has declared its willingness to assist renewed peace moves.[6] Meanwhile, in hope of a future unification of the island, the EU has adopted policies to improve the situation for the Turkish Cypriot community (Council of the European Union 2004a, 2006).

The most recent conflict involving an EU member state as a primary warring party did not take place in Europe but in the Middle East, as the United Kingdom joined the United States and Australia in assembling a multinational coalition for the invasion of Iraq in 2003. This war is one of only 8 international wars in the world since 1989. As part of the multinational coalition, many other EU member states contributed troops as secondary warring parties (see footnote 3).

Several EU member states have been active as secondary warring parties since 1989, in particular within the large multinational coalitions assembled to support Kuwait against Iraq in 1991, against the Yugoslav government in the Kosovo conflict in 1999, and in the recent conflicts covered by the US-proclaimed "war on terror." In addition to the attack on Iraq 2003, this includes the fighting against the Taleban in Afghanistan since 2001, supporting the new Iraqi government against insurgents since 2004, and joining the USA against al-Qaida since 2001.

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4 EU legislation is suspended on the Turkish Cypriot part of the island, i.e. the part that is not under Greek Cypriot administration. However, the island as a whole is considered an EU member state, and Turkish Cypriots in principle enjoy rights as EU citizens.

5 For further analysis, see e.g. ICG (2006); Coppetiers et al. (2004); Diez et al. (2006); Richmond (2005); Schimmelfennig et al. (2006) and Tocci (2007).

6 A new round of talks between the leaders of the two Cypriot communities began in 2008 (Pope & Akyel 2010).

Graph 2. EU conflict involvement, 1989-2008

Secondary warring countries — Secondary suppporting countries

Conflict locations / Year

EU member states have in general been reluctant to deploy troops in support of a side in an ongoing conflict, even though there are indicators that this approach may be changing. Provision by EU member states of other forms of secondary support to a warring party has occurred fairly constantly throughout the period. An interesting question about the member states' involvement in armed conflict is to what extent this type of activity has evolved over time. Graph 2 shows how many different EU members are involved as either warring or supporting parties in an armed conflict per year, 1989-2008.

Graph 3. EU member states in armed conflict

EU members (secondary warring) — EU members (secondary warring or support)

No. of states / Year

During the last two years, 25 of the 27 EU member states (not Cyprus and Malta) have been active as secondary warring parties. The recent increase is almost exclusively connected to the "war on terror" involvement and in particular in support of the government in Afghanistan. The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) started as a UN mandated mission to provide security in Kabul during a post-conflict transition period. After the Taleban regrouped and the conflict resumed in 2003, ISAF has taken on an increasingly active role in fighting the rebels, thereby surpassing the US-led effort to support the Afghan administration. Since 2006, ISAF has formal control of the international military operation in Afghanistan, thereby constituting a secondary warring party to the intrastate conflict. The involvement in multinational coalitions during the 1990s also stands out in the data, while the other cases of secondary support by EU member states have primarily consisted of British or French involvement in conflicts in Africa (see appendix III).

Graph 4. Regions where EU has employed secondary warring/support

- Africa
- Asia
- Europe
- Middle East

EU member states have been active as secondary warring or supporting parties in conflicts in 15 different African countries, for instance in Chad, Rwanda, and Mozambique. There has also been little change over time, as member states already in 1989-90 were active in Comoros, Rwanda and Mozambique, with recent activity in Chad, Djibouti, and Niger.

EU and terrorism

Even though Europe has a long history of being the target of terrorist attacks, co-operation against these threats were for a long time absent from the EU agenda. Of the current EU member states, only France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom have experienced terrorist attacks since 1989 with the most serious incident the attack in Madrid in 2004 with 191 people killed.[7] It has instead been events outside Europe or against American or Israeli targets in Europe that have been followed by counterterrorism initiatives from the EU. The EU response to terrorism has primarily consisted of increased cooperation among the national police and intelligence agencies, thus within the field of justice and home affairs rather than external relations. This contrasts with the prominent role terrorism has been given in the 2003 European Security Strategy, where it is listed as the first of the key threats to Europe.

The measure most commonly employed externally against terrorism by the EU has been sanctions. The earliest cases were as early as 1986 when sanctions were imposed against Libya and Syria based on the allegation that these governments were sponsoring terrorism. These followed the attack on a nightclub in Berlin popular amongst US soldiers, and attacks on the check-in desks of the Israeli airline El Al in Rome and Vienna (Kreutz 2005). In addition, when the EU in 1994 imposed sanctions on Sudan, support of terrorism was also one of the stated reasons as France demanded that the Sudanese government extradite the terrorist Carlos "The Jackal."

Even though terrorism was one of the many issues covered by the 1999 Tampere programme for the creation of an area of security, freedom, and justice, it was the attacks on USA on 11 September 2001 that triggered a plethora of EU activity within this field. This included an immediate proclamation that terrorists or their sponsors would not find a safe haven in Europe and a Council meeting on 21 September 2001 adopted an action to combat terrorism. Following

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7 "Terrorism" is a contested concept and the definition offered here is very restrictive capturing only lethal attacks from non-state groups against civilians (data from the UCDP one-sided violence dataset, cf. Eck & Hultman 2007). However, only the attacks in Madrid 2004, the attacks in London 2005, and the actions of IRA 1992 and UFF 1993 are above or near the UCDP threshold for inclusion of 25 deaths in a calendar year. For a more inclusive definition and data, see Europol (2010)).

the UN decision to freeze the assets of unspecified "terrorists" on 28 September 2001, the EU created a list of targeted organisations and individuals headed by al-Qaeda and affiliates. This led to some confusion as the UN already had sanctions in place since 1999 against the Taleban and al-Qaeda, so the EU list was revised in December 2001 to only include targets excluded from UN sanctions (Council of the European Union 2001). When the UN in 2002 eventually modified and specified the targets for its' sanctions, the EU included those sanctions as a separate regime, in effect creating two separate lists of targets for their involvement in terrorism (Eriksson 2009). In the aftermath of these measures there has been an active debate about the legal status for the implementation of these lists and in particular how the listing practices may infringe on the human rights of EU citizens (Eriksson 2009, Tridimas & Gutiérrez-Fons 2008).

In addition to the sanctions on terrorists, EU member states responded to the 11 September attacks by offering their support and assistance to the US, in particular those EU member states that were also members of NATO. It was also primarily under the NATO umbrella that EU member states participated in the US-led involvement in the Afghanistan conflict, even though additional support was provided within the "coalition of the willing." As mentioned above, many EU countries have since been involved in supporting the Afghan government as part of the ISAF mission.

2.2 EU as a peacemaker

This section focuses on EU measures to manage and resolve armed conflicts in the world, a practice that is generally referred to as third party activity.[8] Possible measures to help settle ongoing conflicts range from peacekeeping to acting as a mediator or pressuring the warring sides to reconsider their policies. The section starts with an overview of the EU's and the individual member states' third party involvement in armed conflicts during 1989-2008. The focus is on

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8   The UCDP defines a third party as "a party that is involved in either helping the warring parties to regulate the incompatibility or the level of the violence and work as an intermediary between the two" – for instance, it can mean providing peacekeeping troops, acting as a mediator in talks concerning the incompatibility (conflict issue), etc.

third party activities as defined in UCDP data. However, much of the EU's work to promote peaceful resolution of conflicts falls outside of this definition, and subsequent sections therefore discuss in more detail the different aspects of EU intervention.

EU third party activity

Looking at EU involvement as a third party in armed conflicts in 1989-2008, the picture is one of a few engagements per year (see graph 5). In 1991-1995, nearly all the interventions were related to the conflicts in the Balkans (the one exception being the conflict over Kurdistan in Iraq). Following the settlements of the conflicts in Bosnia in 1995, the EU almost completely withdrew from third party activity. This decrease in international activism was not disconnected from global developments as a similar trend was identified for the UN and individual member states. Even though this time period coincided with a decline in armed conflict, it has been suggested that the UN and the EU were concerned about a perceived poor performance in preventing and stopping such events as the Balkan wars or the genocide in Rwanda 1994. Since the turn of the century, the EU has resumed its activism even though it remains involved in only a fraction of currently ongoing conflicts.

Graph 5. EU and member states as third parties, 1989-2008

The geographical scope of EU third party activity has broadened in this last decade. Whereas the early period was almost exclusively focused on settling conflicts in the Balkans and the southern Mediterranean region, the EU has now been active as a third party in countries such as Colombia, Indonesia, Sudan, and Sri Lanka. In most cases the EU has acted as a mediator or facilitator, but it has also taken part in peacekeeping missions (as, for instance, in the cases of the Joint Control Commission in Georgia, and the participation of EUFOR in Chad in 2007-8) (see appendix II).

Graph 6. EU third party interventions, 1989-2008

Despite the resources attributed to developing EU institutions in the field of third party activity since the creation of the CFSP in 1992, this has not yet replaced the activism of individual member states.

As is shown in graph 5, hroughout most of the time period, individual member states have been more active than the EU even though this trend is seemingly on the decrease. Indeed, during the last two years, none of the member states have acted independently as a third party in a conflict at all. So far, this has not been accompanied by a corresponding increase in EU activity.

However, it is possible that EU member states are increasingly shifting their activity to joint operations rather than acting on their own, but these EU actions often fall outside of what UCDP defines as third party activity, as will be elaborated upon in a later section.

Graph 7. Third party interventions by the UN and the EU, 1989-2008

When comparing EU third party activity to that of the UN, there seems to be some convergence; while UN activity has decreased somewhat since the early 1990s, EU activity has remained stable and thus the gap between the number of conflicts with UN third party involvement and those with EU involvement has decreased. Interestingly, the EU has mainly intervened in conflicts which have also seen UN involvement, with one regional exception – Asia. Here, the EU has acted alone, more specifically in the cases of Indonesia (Aceh) in 2003 and 2005, and Sri Lanka (Eelam) in 2006. In 2008, the EU was involved as a third party in the conflicts in Israel (Palestine), Chad and Georgia (South Ossetia).

Graph 8. Regional distribution of EU third party intervention, 1989-2008

■ EU third party involvement ■ UN involvement in same conflict

BOX B: Mediation activities of the EU in intrastate low-level conflicts, 1993 - 2004[9]

Conflicts that have become protracted and where the country is destroyed as a consequence of several decades of warfare or high intensity violence are arguably more difficult to settle. Thus, it may be most important to react quickly and settle conflicts before they escalate or become protracted. UCDP in collaboration with the Folke Bernadotte Academy has collected data on conflict management efforts for the years 1993-2004 specifically for low-intensity intrastate armed conflicts.

This dataset, Managing Intrastate Low-level Conflict (MILC), is more detailed and includes more types of conflict management activity than the UCDP third party data, and is limited to intrastate low-level conflicts. Furthermore, MILC data includes activities that involve only one of the primary warring parties in a conflict, and therefore shows a slightly different picture compared to the UCDP third party data (Melander et al. 2009).

(box continued on next page)

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9 The findings in this section largely draw on Altpeter (2010). The paper explores the role of regional organizations in conflict management based on various UCDP datasets and on two case studies of the mediation efforts of the EU in Macedonia and ECOWAS in Côte d'Ivoire.

Box B continued:

Graph 9. Conflics with EU involvement and number of activities

■ Conflict ■ Activities

No. of activities/conflicts — *Year*

As has been noted before, the EU has chosen to focus its peacemaking efforts to a relatively narrow set of conflicts. Graph 9 shows that in the conflicts where the EU has been active, there have been many events suggesting that the EU has dedicated a significant effort to solve these conflicts. The level of commitment does not seem to be consistent across all conflicts, though, as the trends for events and number of conflicts are poorly correlated. Activities in 1993 and 2001 account for more than half of the conflict management activities of the EU (129 out of 235), but addressed only a comparatively small share of all conflicts with EU third party-involvement. The peak of the conflict management activities of the EU in 1993 is mainly due to its involvement in the Balkans. The activities in 2001 for the most part addressed the Israel (Palestine) conflict, which was of major concern for the international community after the start of the second intifada in late 2000. On the other hand, the year 1998, which saw the highest number of conflicts with EU mediation, displays relatively few conflict management activities of the EU.

Using the MILC data also makes it possible to more closely disaggregate the type of measures preferred by the EU. In addition to what can be termed "traditional" third party roles such as mediation or good offices, it also includes information on bilateral talks with either the government side or the rebel side, which is quite common as a means to initiate a negotiation or to pressure an actor to change conflict behaviour. Finally, it also incorporates deployments on the ground in the form of peacekeepers, fact-finding missions, or arbitration.

(box continued on next page)

Box B continued:

Graph 10. Types of EU third party activity

- ■ Bilateral talks with government
- ▨ Bilateral talks with rebels
- ■ Third party talks (with both), good offices
- □ Deployment on the ground (arbitration, peacekeeping, observers)

Graph 10 identifies the features of EU conflict management activity in 1993-2004. Most events have consisted of talks with either of the two combatant parties, in particular the government side. This is in contrast to what is generally perceived as being the role of mediators, suggesting that the EU may be using its ability to influence warring sides through multidimensional roles; as individual member states, as an important economic power, and as central actors within the UN system

EU Special Representatives

The EU launched its first Special Representative (EUSR) in March 1996 for the Great Lakes region in Africa. The immediate imperative was to provide a political framework for the humanitarian and financial aid that was directed to the troubled region. Since the appointment of Aldo Ajello in early 1996, the EUSRs have evolved from a handful of pragmatically motivated assistance agents with often vague and limited mandates, to currently 12 institutionalised and diversified actors for direct crisis management, inter- and intra-agency coordination and EU policy formulation (Grevi 2007; Adebahr 2009: 20f; Adebahr & Grevi 2007). Since the imposition of the post, there have been 31 separate EUSRs, with the greatest number of different

EUSRs for the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.[10] The persons holding office are often career diplomats, politicians or other experts with some connection to the objective of the mandate. Though they seem to be relatively evenly distributed among Member States, no female EUSR has yet been appointed. The EUSRs were given a formalised role in the 2000 Amsterdam Treaty and accompanying specific Council guidelines (2000) (Adebahr 2009). Most EUSRs remain based in Brussels, and not in the field. Currently, only the EUSRs of Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Afghanistan/Pakistan are stationed in their area of responsibility (Grevi 2007).

In general, the EUSRs have often been appointed to a certain region rather than to specific conflicts. The most recent, double mandate of Ettore Francesco Sequi exemplifies this in that it covers both Afghanistan and Pakistan. Whereas the first EUSRs often had limited mandates that primarily sought to complement other already active conflict resolution initiatives, the EUSRs have since come to take a leading role in mediation efforts. One such example was the Ohrid negotiations between the Macedonian government and ethnic Albanian representatives in 2001 where the EUSR operated together with American mediators. With the exception of the very first EUSR, the early mandates primarily concerned the EU's immediate geographical neighbourhood but this has changed. More recent appointments have focused on for example Sudan and the Central Asian region which may indicate a growing recognition of the potential of the EUSRs. This could also be seen in the fast appointment of Central Asian EUSR, Pierre Morel, to the Georgian crisis in 2008. The EUSRs have also increasingly come to coordinate various EU missions. The EU's first experience of this type of coordination occurred in late 2005 when EUSR Marc Otte channelled guidance from High Representative Javier Solana to the EU Border Mission and the EU Co-ordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support, in the Middle East (Adebahr 2009).

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10 Two EUSR mandates have been permanently terminated (Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) 1998-1999 and South Eastern Europe 1999-2001). For a full list of past and present EUSRs, see appendix III.

EU peace operations

The establishment of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)[11] made peacekeeping formally possible under the EU's institutional umbrella; the first mission to be launched under the ESDP framework was the EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM BiH), on 1 January 2003.[12] However, European common action in this field began much earlier. Peace operations launched by EU member states preceding the ESDP framework included the European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM), a military monitoring mission to Croatia and Slovenia deployed in 1991, and the Western European Union Police Force (WEUPF), deployed to Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1994. EU member states have also continuously participated in peace operations under the leadership of other peacekeeping actors – such as the UN, OSCE and NATO – as well as having participated in ad-hoc coalition interventions.

The emergence of the EU as a major crisis management actor has coincided with significant changes to the very nature of peace operations. Where peacekeeping previously focused primarily on assisting the warring parties in verifying a ceasefire – through, for example, observing a disputed boundary – it is now a complex, multi-levelled process aimed at addressing the problems that led to conflict in the first place (or those problems that have followed in its wake) from a variety of angles. Accordingly, since the end of the Cold War, peacekeeping operations have increasingly come to include various non-military components aimed at strengthening institution-building, providing support for human rights and the rule of law, strengthening the police and the judiciary, as well as contributing to successful and fair elections (EU Focus 2008). These types of tasks pertaining to state- and capacity-building are considered to best be performed by civilian personnel.[13] These shifts in the understanding of peacekeeping and new emphasis on conflict transformation are reflected in the type

11 Since the entry into force of the Lisbon treaty, ESDP has been renamed CSDP, the EU Common Security and Defense Policy.

12 The operation was originally tasked with ensuring effective policing arrangements under local ownership through monitoring and mentoring (Council Joint Action, 11 Mar. 2002 on the European Union Police Mission, 2002/210/CFSP). In 2006, the mission mandate was expanded, at the invitation of BiH authorities, to include additional tasks, such as assisting in the fight against organized crime (EU Factsheet 2009).

of crisis management operations the EU has launched since 2003, and the types of tasks they have undertaken.

As of the end of 2009, the EU has launched 22 multilateral operations under the ESDP framework,[14] out of which 20 can be considered to be peace operations (SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database), in which military, civilian-military, and purely civilian operations are included.[15] SIPRI defines peace operations in accordance with UN guidelines which conceptualise peacekeeping as a mechanism with which to create conditions for peace in conflict-ridden countries; the result is that two ESDP operations – EU NAVFOR Somalia and EU Support to AMIS (Darfur) – are excluded from the toll.[16] The EU emphasises the importance of civilian crisis management and has embraced this approach in its missions, in fact; only two of the 12 EU peace operations conducted in 2008 were purely military (Korski & Gowan 2009; Soder 2009). EU peace operations are often very small, and operate under narrow mandates, with such tasks as capacity-building and security sector reform. A few military operations conducted have made up most of the EU's 70,000 deployed personnel since 2003.[17] Operations are, generally speaking, much smaller than the total toll indicates: in 2008, for example, the average EU operation – not including operations deploying military troops – was composed of around 250 personnel.[18] As a multi-levelled organisation, the EU tends to use its operations to reinforce different EU institutions' efforts in other areas, such as development assistance, taking a multi-pronged approach. On the ground, the EU collaborates with other peacekeeping actors, and EU member states continue to contribute

13 In fact, civilian staffing has more than doubled in peace mission staff worldwide between 2003 and 2008. This development has coincided with increases to peacekeeping activities in general, with record-high personnel deployments in 2008 (Soder 2009).

14 An authoritative source describes "some 23 missions" having been launched since 2003 (Grevi et al. 2009). Included in that frequently cited number, however, is the operation EUBAM Moldova/Ukraine, which is a special case since it is not technically subsumed in the ESDP framework, but rather primarily managed by the European Commission (Council Joint Action, 7 Nov. 2005 amending the mandate of the European Union Special Representative for Moldova, 2005/776/CFSP).

15 For a list, see Appendix IV.

16 SIPRI excludes EU NAVFOR Somalia on the basis of its mandate not contributing to peacekeeping or peace-building, and EU Support to AMIS (Darfur) for not being a full-fledged mission in its own right. In contrast, ISIS Europe includes all EU and CSDP missions in its calculations, including planning missions, listing 27 missions in total for the time-period (ISIS data on ongoing and completed CSDP and EU missions, available from URL <http://www.csdpmap.org/>).

17 Calculated for 22 ESDP operations (Council of the European Union 2009; see note 15).

18 Subtracting the total number of deployed personnel to the largest such mission, the EU Rule of Law mission in Kosovo, the average changes to 97 deployed personnel per mission (SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database, available from URL <http://www.sipri.org/databases/pko>).

troops and civilian personnel (including police) to non-EU operations, conducted by organisations such as the UN and NATO.

Box C: EUNAVFOR Somalia – Operation ATALANTA

Cases of piracy in the strategic shipping lanes off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden have increased dramatically in the past two years, bringing global attention to the fragility of the Somali state. To respond to the increased insecurity in these waters, and in support of UN Security Council Resolutions 1814, 1816, 1838, 1846 (2008) and 1897 (2009), EUNAVFOR Somalia – Operation ATALANTA was launched on 8 December 2008. Conducted in the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), the EU's military operation in these waters – its first ever naval operation – seeks to protect World Food Programme (WFP) vessels delivering food aid to Somalia, to protect vulnerable merchant vessels and to deter, prevent and repress acts of piracy and armed robbery in the area, using force if required. Suspected pirates arrested and detained by EUNAVFOR can be prosecuted in an EU member state or in Kenya, as provided for in a 2009 EU-Kenya transfer agreement. A similar arrangement has been concluded with the Republic of Seychelles, and other countries may follow.

As of April 2010, ten EU member states were making permanent operational contributions to EUNAVFOR (the Netherlands, Spain, Germany, France, Greece, Italy, Sweden, Belgium, Luxembourg and Portugal), with more than 1800 military personnel deployed to the operation. In addition, a number of non-EU countries (Norway, Croatia, Montenegro and Ukraine) were also participating in EUNAVFOR. The current operation mandate expires on 12 December 2010. Furthering its involvement in Somalia, the EU on 7 April 2010 launched a new military operation to contribute to the training of Somali security forces, EUTM Somalia.

EU and ESDP peace operations in UCDP data

EU peace operations since 2003 have taken different forms, and have aimed to address a variety of the many significant challenges facing states emerging from armed conflict and instability. Because of the broad range of crisis management activities on behalf of the EU and the fact that they deviate significantly from the traditional role of peacekeeping, many EU and ESDP operations are not included in UCDP data on armed conflict. UCDP data on third party involvement in an armed conflict focuses specifically on activities directly aimed at regulating the conflict incompatibility or level of violence between

the warring parties.[19] It is not sufficient that the peace operation is deployed to the scene of an active conflict; meanwhile, in many cases an EU operation's mandate covers tasks only indirectly connected to the actual conflict.[20] Graph 11 illustrates the manner in which the EU's international peace operations coincide with UCDP conflict years and whether the EU is also coded as a third party to the conflict.

Graph 11. EU & ESDP missions, 2003-2008

The results from data on EU and ESDP operations, juxtaposed with UCDP data, points to a number of interesting indications. Noteworthy is the limited number of cases where EU peace operations are coded as third parties in UCDP data. This is likely to have its explanation in the fact that EU peace operations – compared to for example UN operations – tend to be smaller and focused on a more specialised set of tasks. These operations also appear to often take place outside of active conflicts with the goal of strengthening structures weakened by conflict. However, to entirely disassociate these cases of operations from affecting conflicts or conflict occurrence is not correct: countries emerging from conflict often lack the capability to uphold stability

19 For more on UCDP-definitions, see note 1.

20 To illustrate, consider the case of the EU Police Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) (EUPOL RD Congo). While the intrastate armed conflict has been ongoing during the mission's deployment – and while the weakness of the country's security forces can be understood as both a source and symptom of the conflict – the mission was not related directly to the conflict. The EU mission, rather, as deployed to address a symptom of a weak state.

without international support, including that provided by many EU peace operations. Furthermore, strengthening institutions and accountability may also serve to prevent new conflicts starting or old conflicts recurring.

Also interesting is the fact that, as the graph indicates, the EU throughout the time-period surveyed has increased its deployments of peace operations to the scenes of active armed conflicts, possibly an indication of the EU not only taking on more, but also more difficult, cases.

In regards to the number of peace operations deployed, it is clear that the EU is gradually taking on a more pronounced role as a crisis management actor. In spite of this, the UN continues to dominate peacekeeping activities globally. There are indications that EU peace operations increasingly will be used to complement those of other peacekeeping actors, such as the UN. Due to their ability to deploy fast, the EU operations can be used as "bridging-forces" or reinforcement missions, in the way that the EU has done in DRC and most recently in Chad and the Central African Republic, where a short-term EU operation was recently replaced by a UN presence. Also, it is likely that the EU will continue to contribute to strengthening and co-operating with other regional organisations, such as the African Union (AU).[21]

Since European countries began launching peace operations under the guise of the European Community (EC) or as ad-hoc coalitions, the geographical scope of target countries has expanded significantly. The European peace operations in the 1990s all took place in Europe, in the Balkan region, as did most of the organisation's mediation attempts. EU and ESDP operations since 2003 have been deployed to regions outside of Europe. Graph 12 depicts the regional distribution of EU and ESDP peace operations.[22]

21 The EU has to date contributed significantly to the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), financially, logistically and with expertise.

22 Regions have been coded on the basis of their target country, meaning that the EU Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq (EUJUST LEX), for example, is coded for Iraq, in spite of much of the training having taken place outside of the country.

Graph 12. EU and ESDP peace missions by region, 2003-2008

Legend: ■ Africa ▨ Asia ■ Europe □ Middle East

No. of missions (Y-axis: 0 to 14)
Year (X-axis: 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008)

The EU has deployed peace operations to several parts of the world, including the Palestinian territories, Indonesia (Aceh), and Afghanistan. EUPOL Afghanistan was deployed in 2007 to improve Afghan capabilities in the field of civil policing and law enforcement to strengthen the rule of law. The number of operations launched, however, reveals Africa as a strategic external priority.[23] One of the EU's first military operations under ESDP took place in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in 2003, Operation Artemis. The EU's peacemaking engagement in the DRC has continued: four other operations, with tasks ranging from security sector reform, police training and election support, have since been in operation in the country. As of 2009, two EU peace operations are deployed to the DRC: the EU Advisory and Assistance Mission for DRC Security Reform (EUSEC DR Congo), a civil-military operation, and the EU Police Mission in the DRC (EUPOL DR Congo), a civilian operation. In addition to launching its own peace operations, the EU is also engaged in supporting AU and UN peacekeeping activities in Africa.

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23 International deployments to Africa have increased greatly in Africa also in general terms. Between 1999 and 2008, personnel deployments in Africa have increased by 400%, overtaking deployments to Europe in 2003 (Soder 2009).

3. Promotion of democracy and human rights: EU measures for conflict prevention?

One of the cornerstones for the development of an EU-wide foreign policy has been a self-confessed ambition to promote democracy, respect for human rights, and good governance. Already the 1973 Copenhagen Declaration suggested that common values such as respect for human rights could be the basis for the developing European Political Co-operation and these themes have since been reiterated as key EU objectives, in particular promoted by the European Parliament (King 1999, Manners 2006). In the mid-1990s, these themes started to become linked with the potential for conflict prevention. Following the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, members of the European Parliament and the Commission suggested that measures to prevent conflicts should be explored. Eventually, a Finnish-Swedish initiative to the Council in 1996 suggested that conflict prevention and the building of sustainable peace could be achieved by focusing on democratic, political, and economic means (Manners 2006).

Conflict prevention remained an important aspect for the evolving Common Foreign and Security Policy, in particular the Council meetings in Nice 2000 and Gothenburg 2001. The latter established conflict prevention as a central objective for the EU in its external relations and identified priority areas for how to improve EU capacity. When discussing conflict prevention, an important distinction should be made between short-term and long-term preventive action (Wallensteen & Möller 2003). This paper has already discussed some of the aspects that the EU considers short-term prevention, such as the Special Representatives, crisis management including military action, and peace operations. In addition, the EU has employed a multitude of instruments that can be useful both as long-term and short-term measures, or primarily aimed at addressing the structural causes that increase the risk for conflict onset. This includes sanctions, freezing of development aid, human rights clauses in trade and cooperation agreements, and specified provisions for countries which want to become EU members. What these measures have in common is the stated ambition to promote democracy, respect for human rights and

the rule of law: structural factors that can decrease the risk of conflict outbreak.

EU sanctions

EU sanctions practice has been a reality since a Council Regulation in early 1982 which partially restricted trade with the Soviet Union to protest against its role in the crackdown of the Solidarity movement in Poland. In the ensuing two decades, the EU implemented UN and OSCE embargoes as well as imposed sanctions against 25 different targets (see appendix VI) without acknowledgement that this policy option existed. Indeed, when the EU in 2003 and 2004 produced documents outlining a sanctions policy, it preferred the term "restrictive measures." In practice, the content of these potential restrictive measures is similar to what generally is referred to as sanctions as it lists diplomatic sanctions, suspension of cooperation, boycotts of sport or cultural events, trade sanctions, financial sanctions, flight bans, and restrictions on admission. In most cases, the EU sanctions regime consists of several of these measures, with a preference for arms embargoes and, especially in the last decade, travel restrictions (Kreutz 2005).

As the EU has decided that all UN mandatory sanctions and OSCE sanctions are binding for member states, these should be included when discussing EU sanctions practice. Graph 13 shows the number of targets for sanctions regimes were in place for the years 1989-2008. The figure does not include diplomatic sanctions or boycotts, which are usually symbolic gestures, or suspension of co-operation, as this is addressed separately below.

The 1990s have been referred to as the "sanctions decade" by researchers primarily focusing on UN activity (Cortright & Lopez 2000; Wallensteen et al. 2005). Graph 13 indicates that the EU also expanded its use of sanctions significantly in that time period. At the start of the decade, EU sanctions were imposed as a response to the outbreak of conflict in the Balkans and the Caucasus, but also on cases where the UN was not mandated to impose sanctions. This includes measures against China (1989), Burma/Myanmar (1990), Zaire/DRC (1993), Nigeria (1993), and Sudan (1994) that were all imposed with the stated aim of promoting democracy, punishing human rights violations, or both. In particular, violent repression of democracy movements seemed to invoke EU action during this early period (Kreutz 2005). Many EU sanctions were later superseded by UN mandatory measures, such as in the Balkans and Sudan, while the EU decided to maintain some sanctions after the UN measures had been withdrawn – particularly in the post-conflict phases of the Balkan conflicts.

Somewhat surprising given that the EU in the mid-1990s became increasingly interested in formalising its external promotion of democracy and respect for human rights, the use of sanctions for this end declined. When the EU became more active in using sanctions

again by the turn of the century, the objectives were somewhat different. Even though human rights violations and support for democracy was often mentioned as part of the reason, the main concern has often been other factors. This has included a diplomatic row with Belarus, support of a peace process in Moldova, or targeting individuals linked with terrorism. What became particularly rare was sanctions specifically aimed at stopping ongoing human rights violations, unless these occur within the context of fraudulent elections, an ongoing civil war, or the support of terrorism. The types of sanctions employed have also somewhat changed. Whereas the early period of EU sanctions primarily consisted of arms embargoes, the later regimes have targeted individuals and specifically focused on travel or financial sanctions.

One of the earliest studies done on EU sanctions practice suggested that there seems to be "a preference to use positive rather than negative sanctions, or carrots over sticks" (de Vries & Hazelzet 2005: 151). Whether this holds in general for EU sanctions practice can be debated, but it is clear that when it comes to the promotion of democracy and human rights, the EU has allocated substantial resources to positive incentives. Resources allocated for democracy and human rights projects more than tripled during the 1990s and were provided both to governments undertaking transitions to democracy and to civil society initiatives in authoritarian states such as Belarus (Kreutz 2009, Youngs 2001). In the last years, however, there have been indications that this approach is losing ground as a recent review suggest that the use of such "'democratic rewards'… is patchy and of increasingly limited impact" (Youngs 2008: 2).

In addition to traditional embargoes and measures targeting specific individuals, the EU also includes the suspension of co-operation as a sanctions option even though the latter is excluded from documents presenting current sanctions in force (European Commission 2010). This type of measure can be described as a combination of carrot-and-stick, in particular as it often has been employed in connection with ongoing development aid projects. Since 1983, the European Parliament has produced an annual report and resolution reviewing EU policy and human rights in the world and this was soon accompanied by suggestions that development aid should be refused to governments that did not respect human rights. The first instances of EU suspending

or freezing development funds citing human rights violations was against Liberia and Sudan in 1990, followed by four more cases the following year. By then, the 1991 Luxembourg Council decided that a so-called human rights clause through which human rights violations could lead to the suspension of co-operation should be included in all EU agreements with third countries.

Conditionality

Conditionality can be defined as a situation in which one actor offers to another actor a reward or benefit that is dependent on the fulfilment of certain conditions on the part of the receiving actor. Conditionality can be based on both "carrots" and "sticks" and thus differs from the traditional form of sanctions which are of more punitive nature and are intended to impose additional costs on the target. The most prominent examples of the EU's use of conditionality are the inclusion of human rights clauses in agreements with third countries as well as the demand that the fulfilment of certain democratic criteria is a pre-condition for membership in the Union.

Even though the EU's use of conditionality policy originated from the idea that development aid should only be provided to countries that respect human rights, the end of the Cold war provided an additional impetus for its usefulness. Many post-communist countries and newly independent states proclaimed a desire to quickly establish closer contacts with the EU and eventually become members. As a consequence, the use of human rights and democracy conditionality became a central feature in two different settings; in the general sense with regards to co-operation with any third country in the world, but also specifically in the establishment of criteria for membership applications.

Human rights clauses in the EU's agreements with third countries

Since the decision at the 1991 Luxembourg Council, the EU has promoted the policy of inclusion of so called human rights clauses

in different types of agreements, regulations and instruments with non-EU countries. Human rights clauses are legal provisions which entitle a party to the agreement to "take 'appropriate measures', including the suspending of the agreement, in the event that the other party fails to comply with specified human rights norms" (Bartels 2005: 368). According to the European Parliament, the use of human rights clauses is based on two principles: firstly, only those countries which comply with democratic principles and human rights should be granted economic benefits and, secondly, the EU should not contribute to the violation of these core principles by providing economic benefits to non-democratic states (Bartels 2008). Since the beginning of the 1990s, the EU has included human rights clauses in different types of agreements (trade, cooperation, partnership, stabilisation and association etc.) signed with countries in Europe, the Americas, Africa, Asia and the Middle East. The first operative human rights clause was included in the EU's agreement with Argentina in 1990, and it subsequently became common practice. Graph 14 shows the number of countries with which the EU has agreements that include human rights clauses.

Graph 14. Countries with HR -clause agreements

As the graph indicates, the use of this type of clauses spread quickly in the 1990s. The most notable impact is in 1995, when a human rights clause was introduced into the revised Lomé IV Convention regulating

EU trade development co-operation with African, Caribbean, and Pacific states. In the mid-1990s, the EU also added a so-called suspension mechanism into most agreements. The suspension clause is an important addition as it provides the legal basis for the EU to suspend part or an entire treaty if the signatory country violates human rights. The suspension clause is also included in the revised Lomé IV Convention (1995) and its successor the Cotonou Agreement (2000). According to Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement, if the EU has information about possible human rights violations in the signatory country, it can start consultations and dialogue with the country so that human rights and democratic processes can be restored as quickly as possible. Only in those cases where consultations fail does the EU have the right to suspend some or all of the provisions of the Cotonou Agreement with the country concerned.

Graph 15. EU use of conditionality for development funds

The growing list of agreements with a human rights clause has increased the ability of the EU to act in response to human rights violations; however, there is no indication that the EU became more willing to implement this tool in practice, i.e. the suspension of treaties with countries which have poor human rights record has not become more common. As can be seen in Appendix VII, since the end of the 1990s the EU has been mostly involved in consultations than actual suspension of the treaties. In the years 2000-2005 (which is the last

year for which we have data), the EU only suspended development aid using the human rights clause against Haiti and Liberia (2001), Zimbabwe (2002), and Guinea (2005). In those cases when the EU invoked human rights clauses, most of the time the reference was made to violations of democratic principles and not human rights. This observation is confirmed by the study conducted on the request of the European Parliament, according to which, the EU tends to act in two situations: when there is a political crisis such as a coup (Fiji 2000) or a flawed election (Haiti 2000) or when sudden and grave human rights violations take place (Russia 1999) (Bartels 2008). A systematic inclusion of human rights clauses in the EU's legal agreements with third countries is a significant step in promoting human rights worldwide. However, the important question of the clauses' practical impact remains open, as the EU has preferred softer measures and rarely opted for treaty suspension.

EU membership and formal association conditionality

The EU's promotion of human rights is not limited to the use of human rights clauses. Another important tool is the EU's membership conditionality, which the EU uses towards the countries which could eventually become its members. This type of conditionality focuses on "carrots" rather than "sticks", and means that the EU uses positive incentives to influence the behaviour of the non-EU states. When a country wants to join or establish a formal association with the EU, it is expected to comply with the rules and regulations of the Union. However, the EU has created additional conditions for entering such agreements which refer to domestic institutions and laws in the non-EU countries. These conditions were originally concerned with economic policies but eventually were complemented with requirements for democracy and human rights. Greece's application to the then-EEC was, for example, suspended during the years of military rule 1967-1974. As it later was generally considered that the ambition of Greece, Spain and Portugal to join the EU had helped their transition to democracy in the late 1970s, the EU eventually pursued a similar strategy towards the eastern European states that sought closer links with the organisation.

Since 1995, the conditions imposed on applicant countries are known as the Copenhagen criteria (economic, political and acquis conditions), according to which, only countries which are democratic and governed by the rule of law, respect human rights and protect minorities can become members of the EU. The EU puts extra emphasis on the protection of minorities, since ethnic tensions could increase the risk of conflict. By making its membership dependent on certain conditions, the EU creates positive incentives for the applicant states to change their behaviour. In other words, with the help of the membership conditions the EU tries to ensure that the candidate states have as high human rights standards as the EU members. So far the EU used membership conditionality towards the post-communist states that joined the EU in 2005 (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Poland, Hungary, Slovenia, Slovakia and Czech Republic) and in 2007 (Romania and Bulgaria). The policy is also being applied to the current candidate and potential candidate states.

Although widely applied by the EU, membership conditionality has its limits. First, it can only be used until the country joins the EU, i.e. during the pre-accession period. There is no clear evidence that the accession to the EU has a negative effect on countries' human rights performance (Padskocimaite 2009). However, only after a longer time period will it be possible to say whether the effects of membership requirements are sustainable. Another problem is related to the ability of conditionality in bringing about both legal and behavioural changes in the candidate states. So far most of the positive changes in the human rights field are legal and institutional and less behavioural (Padskocimaite 2009; Schimmelfennig & Schwellnus 2006). Despite these shortcomings, studies suggest that EU membership conditionality under certain conditions can be quite successful in improving the human rights record of the new member states (Kelley 2006; Schimmelfennig 2005).

4. Have EU measures succeeded?

The overview of EU activity suggests that the EU has become a key international actor concerned with peacemaking and conflict prevention. As one of the cornerstones of the EU approach is the preference of acting within the UN system, it is in particular a notable ambition to address issues that fall outside the UN agenda such as the protection of human rights and the promotion of democracy. However, pertinent questions arise regarding whether the EU has focused its attention on the cases and issues that are most relevant, and whether the EU activity has had any substantial positive impact.

Existing research has not provided a clear systematic investigation into whether EU measures have been successful. This does not suggest that there has been a lack of evaluations, assessments, or critical studies of the EU measures, far from it. Some EU institutions produce annual progress reports and the "Policy Departments" include researchers that critically assesses EU developments in publicly available papers. In addition, the European Parliament regularly subcontracts external experts to investigate specified issues or cases. Furthermore, EU activity is closely watched by numerous non-governmental organisations and an expanding field of academics.

Despite this plethora of individuals and organisations interested in the EU activity, there has not been any authoritative study on the general impact of EU measures. There are several possible reasons for this. First, because of the strong research tradition regarding the EU institutional and legal framework there is less interest in the actual content of policy than the processes through which it can be pursued. Second, much more attention is being directed towards investigating how any given specific EU policy is formulated or implemented than its impact on the target. Third, studies tend to either make the argument that "EU foreign policy" consists of a multitude of instruments, or evaluate the use of a single instrument. Fourth, most studies are either single-case or focusing on a specific region where all countries have experienced some sort of interaction with the EU. Thus, when discussing the impact of the EU on, for example, a civil war, the reference point becomes whether the EU could have been more influential if using other – hypothetical - measures. This is

obviously important but it does not measure the actual impact of the policies used in that specific case; instead, the reference point should be what would have happened in the civil war in the event of no EU measures?

In the following section, we draw on data collected and provided by the UCDP to explore EU impact on peacemaking and conflict prevention globally 1989-2008. A note of caution when interpreting the results is necessary. We are simply presenting correlations without any theoretical expectations that could determine our model design. In addition to the specified EU measures, all models control for economic status and regime type, whether the country is located in Europe or Africa, and the year of the observation. In the first section, we focus on the impact of EU peacemaking.

Table 1. EU and Conflict Termination, 1989-2008

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
EU 2nd war/sup	1.62 (0.39)***	- ('-)	- ('-)	- ('-)	1.61 ('0.39)***
EU 3rd party	- ('-)	1.83 (0.45)***	- ('-)	- ('-)	1.60 ('0.52)***
EU sanctions	- ('-)	- ('-)	0.08 (0.46)	- ('-)	-0.10 ('0.47)
EUSR	- ('-)	- ('-)	- ('-)	1.06 (0.35)***	0.81 (0.27)***
GDP	-0.00 ('0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 ('0.00)
Democracy	-0.01 ('0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)
Europe	-0.01 ('0.49)	-0.07 ('0.47)	0.02 ('0.47)	-0.05 ('0.47)	-0.04 ('0.46)
Africa	0.16 ('0.33)	0.25 (0.33)	0.25 (0.33)	0.21 (0.33)	0.14 (0.33)
Year	-0.05 ('0.01)***	-0.06 (0.01)***	-0.05 (0.01)***	-0.06 (0.02)***	-0.06 (0.02)
N of observations	2 559	2 559	2 522	2 522	2 522
Log likelihood	-501.6	-503.8	-507.9	-504.3	-493.2

Standard errors adjusted for clustering on country.

*= $p < 0.10$, **= $p < 0.05$, and ***= $p < 0.01$

Table 1 presents the results relating to the termination of an ongoing civil war (data from Kreutz 2010). Several EU measures have a positive impact on bringing fighting to an end. Of particular interest is the positive influence when the EU actively tries to mediate between the warring sides as a third party as well as the effect of having an EU Special Representative dedicated to the conflict. Somewhat more surprising is that conflicts are more likely to end if the EU has intervened with troops or support for one of the warring sides. In general, it appears that the positive effect of the EU in ending conflicts is a consequence of having a designated presence in the conflict zone rather than, for example, sanctions or conditionality agreements. Whether such EU involvement encourages the belligerents to settle the conflict through negotiations is another issue. To investigate this proposition, we focus specifically on the signing of peace agreements.

Table 2. EU and Peacemaking, 1989-2008

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
EU 2nd war/sup	2.00 (0.50)***	- ('-)	- ('-)	- ('-)	2.05 ('0.50)***
Eu 3rd party	- ('-)	2.75 (0.51)***	- ('-)	- ('-)	2.21 ('0.72)***
EU sanctions	- ('-)	- ('-)	0.92 (0.45)**	- ('-)	0.65 ('0.35)*
EUSR	- ('-)	- ('-)	- ('-)	1.78 (0.40)***	1.43 (0.30)***
GDP	-0.00 ('0.00)*	-0.00 (0.00)**	-0.00 (0.00)**	-0.00 (0.00)*	-0.00 (0.00)*
Democracy	0.03 ('0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)*
Europe	-0.96 ('0.52)*	-1.07 ('0.44)**	-1.16 ('0.53)**	-1.15 ('0.48)**	-1.45 ('0.46)***
Africa	0.70 ('0.35)**	0.83 (0.35)**	0.77 (0.36)**	0.77 (0.35)**	0.68 (0.35)*
Year	-0.00 ('0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)
N of observations	2 691	2 691	2 645	2 645	2 645
Log likelihood	-434.2	-431.2	-442.9	-431.0	-407.7

Standard errors adjusted for clustering on country.

*= $p < 0.10$, **= $p < 0.05$, and ***= $p < 0.01$

When focusing on the signing of peace agreements in table 2, it becomes very clear that the EU has been very successful in its peacemaking activity. When the EU has taken an active role in a conflict, either supporting one of the sides or mediating as a third party, having appointed a Special Representative, or having imposed sanctions on the country, there is an increased likelihood that a peace agreement is signed. Sanctions were not correlated with an increased chance for conflict ending according to table 1. However, peace agreements are not necessarily signed immediately at the end of conflict (Harbom et al. 2006). The effect of EU sanctions can provide an incentive for the belligerents to remain committed to finding a negotiated solution even in the unstable aftermath of armed activity. When looking at model 5, all EU measures remain positively correlated and statistically significant with the signing of peace agreements even when included in the same model. This suggests that each of the measures has been influential in itself rather than part of the same "package" employed in the successful cases. However, it can be expected that the identified positive impact of EU involvement on peacemaking is a consequence of the organisation's ability to provide both "carrots and sticks" and tailor its strategy using different instruments including economic, civilian, and military engagement.

In addition to the involvement in peacemaking, the EU has publicly endorsed an ambition to prevent conflicts by the promotion of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. Table 3 presents the results of how EU measures have impacted on indicators of good governance, human rights, and the rule of law.

Table 3. EU and Good Governance, 1989-2008

Variable	Coup at-tempt	Democrati-zation	Civil war start	Government one-sided	Any one-sid-ed violence
EU sanctions (lagged)	0.75 (0.41)*	-0.28 ('0.20*	-0.29 ('0.50)	1.09 ('0.66)*	0.49 ('0.68)
EUSR (lagged)	-0.01 ('0.54)	0.43 (0.20)**	0.71 ('0.49)	1.74 ('0.55)***	2.34 ('0.43)***
HR conditionality	-0.36 ('0.34)	0.01 ('0.10)	0.42 (0.32)	-0.06 ('0.47)	-0.14 ('0.40)

Variable	Coup at-tempt	Democrati-zation	Civil war start	Government one-sided	Any one-sid-ed violence
Aid suspension (lagged(	-1.04 ('1.04)	0.07 ('0.28)	0.13 ('0.68)	0.12 (0.49)	-0.33 (0.45)
GDP	-0.01 ('0.01)	0.00 (0.00)***	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
Democracy (lagged)	0.02 ('0.02)	-0.05 (0.01)***	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	0.00 (0.00)
Europe	-1.46 ('0.93)	0.36 ('0.13)***	-0.02 ('0.52)	-1.19 ('0.97)	-1.45 ('0.78)
Africa	1.21 ('0.30)***	0.17 (0.10)	0.23 (0.39)	0.49 (0.36)	0.42 (0.35)
Year	-0.01 ('0.04)	-0.03 (0.01)***	-0.08 (0.02)	-0.04 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.03)
N of observations	2 265	2 259	2 259	2 265	2 265

Standard errors adjusted for clustering on country.
*= p < 0.10, **= p <0.05, and ***= p <0.01

The first model in table 3 focuses on the incidence of a coup attempt in a country. The strongest correlation is that coup d'états are more likely in Africa while EU measures have performed poorly in preventing such attempts. Indeed, when a country is a target of EU sanctions there is an increased risk of a subsequent coup attempt.

In the second model, we turn to cases of democratisation. The promotion of and support to democratisation is one of the key ambitions of EU policy and much resources and attention has been dedicated to this issue. However, most specific EU policies do not provide a clear increase in the likelihood of democratisation. The only measure with a statistically significant effect is the EU Special Representatives, which make democratisation more likely.

Taking a closer look, we also see that democratic transitions are more likely in Europe and in economically developed countries suggesting that the EU can be indirectly helpful. This can, for example, suggest that a future membership or formal association with the EU can help countries to democratise faster and with fewer setbacks. This finding indicates some interesting potential pathways that can be explored by the EU in the future. By making efforts to tailor its interaction to

each external country, including carrots as well as potential sticks, it may be possible to spread this effect also to areas beyond the EU's immediate neighbourhood.

The third model focuses explicitly on the prevention of civil war. The findings are not encouraging. None of the EU measures included in the model have any statistically significant effect that reduces the likelihood of a civil war starting in a country. What can explain this finding? It may be that the assumptions of EU decision-makers in the mid-1990s about how to prevent conflicts were incorrect, or that EU activities have failed to make a sufficient impact.

Finally, the fourth and fifth models focus on severe cases of human rights violations. The UCDP one-sided violence dataset (Eck & Hultman 2007) includes the deliberate killing of civilians by organised actors. Model 4 presents the results for killings by the government and model 5 for all actors in a country. Once again, the results are not encouraging; none of the measures employed by the EU reduces the likelihood of one-sided killings. On the contrary, the deliberate targeting of civilians by a government becomes more likely if the EU has appointed a Special Representative to the region or if the EU has imposed sanctions on the country.[24] Even though the latter is only statistically significant at the 90% confidence level, it indicates a potential problem since the EU on several occasions has imposed sanctions specifically to protest against this type of behaviour.

In sum, a tentative evaluation of whether the EU has been successful as a peacemaker or in its stated ambition for conflict prevention shows mixed results. The encouraging findings are that the EU has been very successful in helping to bring conflicts to an end and to get the parties to settle their differences through a peace agreement. This has been achieved through a willingness to engage in the difficult task of mediation and peacemaking, including the use of the relatively recent Special Representatives. With regards to the EU's ability to prevent conflicts, results are mixed. It can still be suspected that the

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24 To ensure the direction of casualty between sanctions and the killing of civilians, we lag the sanctions variable. That is, if there are EU sanctions against country X in 1995, this correlates with the possible killing of civilians in country X in 1996.

EU presence as an attractive trade and political partner can provide support and encourage positive developments in many unstable countries. However, the specific measures that the EU itself most strongly advertises have had no, or even unwanted impact. Our findings suggest that even if the EU continues to explore new policy options and ambitions, it should not ignore its record of success as a mediator or facilitator of peace processes.

5. A new start: Implications and recommendations

The adoption of the Lisbon Treaty and the creation of a High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy provides for a new start for the EU in the international arena. The report has provided an overview of EU activity as a conflict actor, as a peacemaking actor, and in the field of promoting democracy and human rights. Some general trends have been discerned, and strengths and weaknesses of EU activities identified. Based on the findings, as well as on the core objectives of EU foreign policy as expressed by the organisation itself, some general implications that should inform the new era of the EU's international activity are presented below.

Focus on constructive engagements
The review of EU activities shows that despite core values pertaining to the promotion of peace and security, the organisation's involvement in third party activities has not increased over the studied period. Meanwhile, the active involvement of EU member states in armed conflict has seen a dramatic increase (mainly in connection to the "war on terror"). Although such engagements take place on behalf of the individual member states rather than the EU as an organisation, this distinction is becoming increasingly blurred, and outside observers and local populations in conflict zones may not make this distinction. Member states' involvement in conflicts thus tarnishes the image of the EU as an actor for peace, and may divert resources from strategies towards that end. It is found in this report that when the EU has acted as a third party, it has had a high success rate in promoting conflict termination and peace agreements. The EU should therefore devote more efforts to such constructive peace engagements, and seek to get the member states on board towards this goal.

Make use of, and develop, crisis management capacities
There are several examples of how engagement by the EU has helped contain crises and prevent conflicts from escalating. As shown in the MILC data, presented in this report, the EU has devoted frequent efforts to solve a number of strategically important conflicts, which have seen a high number of activities. The data also shows that a preferred measure has been bilateral talks, particularly with the government side, a strategy where an economically and politically

important actor such as the EU can be expected to have a high level of success. Such engagements should be continuously utilised and strengthened. A fruitful measure would likely be to further clarify, formalise and strengthen the role of the EU Special Representatives, who can facilitate a fast response to emerging crises as well as lead and coordinate EU responses.

ESDP operations: strengthen the performance in peacekeeping

Since the launch of the first ESDP operations in 2003, EU peacekeeping and peacebuilding has become more institutionalised, enabling the EU to take the lead and to be more effective in these pursuits. The EU appears to be taking on a more pronounced role, even addressing more and harder cases than previously. However, most of these operations fall outside of traditional conflict resolution and third party activities, as they are often more narrow in scope and focused on prevention or rebuilding. While reconstruction is certainly important, it would be useful to strengthen the conflict resolution and peacekeeping aspects of these relatively new operations. Furthermore, it is noted that ESDP operations can be deployed fast, creating a much-needed capacity to complement UN activities through rapid reaction or bridging operations.

Democracy and human rights: remain a leading force for change

This report observes on sanctions and conditionality that the EU has made significant efforts to promote democracy and human rights by the use of carrots and sticks. The increasing economic and political importance of the EU has lent further weight to such strategies. However, conditionality clauses have mainly been effective in promoting change from authoritarian rule, but provide less efficient tools for addressing relapses. As can be seen, aid has rarely been suspended in response to human rights violations, and the membership conditionality loses its power once a state has become a member of the union. Implementing measures in reaction to human rights abuses has proven difficult as the term incorporates a wide range of actions; the EU has found it easier to take punitive measures in response to actions such as electoral malpractice. The EU could improve its performance in promoting human rights by formalising and clarifying the conditions under which aid is withdrawn, making implementation of this mechanism easier. Furthermore, EUSRs and External Action

representatives could be given the task of monitoring compliance with these provisions. It would also be beneficial to provide additional benefits to those states that perform well, making further steps to strengthen human rights pay off. Through development of sanctions and conditionality, the EU's role in promoting democracy and human rights may be further strengthened. As no other strong actor is pursuing these values globally, the EU may have a particular role to play.

Draw on the competence of the entire Union

It is noted in the report that none of the EU Special Representatives have been women. Similarly, a relatively limited category of diplomats, civil servants and military officers make up much of the leadership in the area of peace and security. By drawing from a wider circle, striving for diversity along gender, ethnic and religious dimensions as well as recruiting people from the academic and civil society spheres, the EU could strengthen its capacity for analysis and action.

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Appendices

Appendix I: Armed Conflicts Active in 2008[i]

Interstate conflicts

Djibouti – Eritrea

Internationalised conflicts

Side A	Side B
Iraq + multinational coalition	Al-Mahdi Army, ISI
Afghanistan + multinational coalition	Hizb-i Isla mi-yi Afghanistan, Taleban
Somalia + Ethiopia	Al-Shabaab, UIC, Harakat Ras Kamboni
Georgia	Republic of South Ossetia + Russia
USA + Afghanistan, Pakistan, Romania	al-Qaida

Intrastate conflicts

Conflict name	Side B
Pakistan	TTP
Pakistan (Baluchistan)	BLA, BRA
Sri Lanka (Eelam)	LTTE
Thailand (Patani)	Patani insurgents
Philippines	CPP
Philippines (Mindanao)	MILF
Burma (Karen)	KNU
Burma (Shan)	SSA-S
India	CPI-M
India (Assam)	ULFA
India (Dimaraji)	DHD – BW
India (Islamic State)	PULF
India (Kashmir)	Kashmir insurgents
India (Manipur)	KCP, PREPAK
DRC	CNDP
DRC (Kingdom of Kongo)	BDK
Burundi	Palipehutu-FNL
Chad	AN
Sudan	JEM, SLM/A, SLM/A-Unity
Ethiopia (Ogaden)	ONLF
Ethiopia (Oromiya)	OLF
Mali (Azawad)	ATNMC

i As defined by UCDP: " An armed conflict is a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in one calendar year." Conflicts in bold had the intensity of war, >1000 battle-related deaths.

Conflict name	Side B
Algeria	AQIM
Niger	MNJ
Israel (Palestine)	Hamas, PIJ
Iran	Jondullah, PJAK
Turkey (Kurdistan)	PKK
Russia (Caucasus Emirate)	Forces of the Caucasus Emirate
Colombia	ELN, FARC
Peru	Sendero Luminoso

Source: : UCDP Database (www.ucpd.uu.se)

Appendix II: Conflicts with EU third party intervention

Year	Conflict(s)
1989	Lebanon
1990	-
1991	Yugoslavia (Croatia), Yugoslavia (Slovenia), Iraq (Kurdistan)
1992	Croatia (Serb), Bosnia and Herzegovina (Serb)
1993	Bosnia and Herzegovina (Croat), Bosnia and Herzegovina (Serb)
1994	-
1995	Croatia (Serb), Bosnia and Herzegovina (Serb)
1996	-
1997	Algeria
1998	Algeria, Yugoslavia (Kosovo)
1999	-
2000	Burundi, Eritrea-Ethiopia, Israel (Palestine)
2001	Macedonia, Colombia
2002	Somalia, Israel (Palestine)
2003	Indonesia (Aceh), Israel (Palestine)
2004	Sudan, Georgia (South Ossetia)
2005	Indonesia (Aceh), Israel (Palestine)
2006	Sri Lanka (Eelam), Israel (Southern Lebanon)
2007	Chad
2008	Israel (Palestine), Chad, Georgia (South Ossetia)

Source: : UCDP Database (www.ucpd.uu.se)

Appendix III: Conflicts with secondary warring or non-warring support from EU member state(s)

Secondary warring	Year(s)
Afghanistan	2001-2008
Central African Republic	1996-1997, 2006
Iraq	2004-2008
Iraq-Kuwait	1991
Sierra Leone	2000
United States	2001-2002, 2004-2008
Yugoslavia (Kosovo)	1999

Secondary supporting	Year(s)
Afghanistan	2003-2008
Algeria	1993-1995
Burundi	1995-1996
Cameroon	1996
Central African Republic	2006
Chad	1992, 1994, 1997, 1999, 2006, 2008
Comoros	1989
Republic of Congo	1998
Cote d'Ivoire	2002
Djibouti-Eritrea	2008
Iraq	2004-2005
Iraq-Kuwait	1990-1991
Mozambique	1989-1992
Nepal	2002
Niger	1992, 2008
Philippines	1997
Philippines (Mindanao)	1997
Rwanda	1990-1994
Senegal (Casamance)	2001
Sierra Leone	1991, 1999-2000
Spain (Basque)	1991-1992
Turkey (Kurdistan)	1993-1999
Uganda	1999
United States	2003-2004

Source: : UCDP Database (www.ucpd.uu.se)

Appendix IV: EU Special Representatives

Focus	Start	End	EUSR	Current Mandate
Afghanistan (+ Pakistan)	2008-07-24	2010-02-28	E. Francesco Sequi (Italy)	- Implement EU and UN resolutions and acts for regional stability
	2002-07-25	2009-02-28	F. Vendrell (Spain)	
	2001-12-10	2008-07-23*	K. P. Klaiber (Germany)	- Supporting the UN SRS
African Union	2007-12-06	2010-08-31	K. Vervaeke (Belgium)	- Facilitate cooperation with the AU
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2009-03-11	2010-02-28	V. Inzko (Austria)	- Implementation of peace agreement
	2007-07-18	2009-02-28	M. Lajčák (Slovak Rep.)	
	2006-01-30	2007-07-30	C. Schwarz-Schilling (Germany)	- Facilitating Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP)
	2002-03-11	2006-01-29*	Lord P. Ashdown (UK)	
Central Asia	2006-10-05	2010-02-28	P. Morel (France)	- Promoting regional cooperation, good governance, human rights and rule of law
	2005-07-18	2006-07-05	J. Kubiš (Slovak Rep.)	
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM)	2005-10-17	2009-09-30	E. Fouéré (Ireland)	- Consolidate the peace process
	2004-07-12	2005-10-16*	M. Sahlin (Sweden)	-Facilitating SAP
	2004-01-26	2002-09-02	S. Jessen- Petersen (Denmark)	- Head of European Commission Delegation
	2002-09-30	2004-07-11*	A. Brouhns (Belgium)	
	2001-10-29	2002-02-28	A. Le Roy (France)	
	2001-07-29	2001-10-29	F. Léotard France)	
Georgia (Crisis between Russia and Georgia)	2008-09-25	2010-02-28	P. Morel (France)	- Facilitate crisis talks - Implement peace agreement from 8 Aug 2008
The Great Lakes Region	2007-02-14	2010-02-28	R. van de Geer (Netherlands)	- Regional Stabilisation - SSR and democratic institutions in the DRC
	1996-03-25	2007-02-13*	A. Ajello (Italy)	- Support peace process in Burundi
Kosovo	2008-02-04	2010-02-28	P. Feith (Netherlands)	- Promoting overall EU coordination
	1999-03-30	1999-07-29	W. Petritsch (Austria)	- Also International Civilian Representative
The Peace Process in the Middle East	2003-07-14	2010-02-28	M. Otte (Belgium)	- Promoting two-state solutions and implementing UN resolutions
	1997-04-29	2002-05-31	N. Eriksson (Sweden)	
	1996-11-25	1997-04-28*	M. Ángel Moratinos (Spain)	

* estimated end date since the date is not provided online by the EU.

Focus	Start	End	EUSR	Current Mandate
Moldova	2005-02-15 2005-03-23	2010-02-28 2005-02-14*	K. Mizsei (Hungary) A. Jacobovits de Szeged (Netherlands)	- Contribute to peaceful settlement of Transnistria conflict - Facilitate the resolution of border issues with Hungary
Pakistan	2009-06-15	2010-02-28	E. F. Sequi (Italy)	- Implement EU and UN resolutions and acts for regional stability - Supporting the UN SRSG
South Caucasus	2006-02-20 2003-07-07	2010-02-28 2006-02-19	P. Semneby (Sweden) H. Talvitie (Finland)	- Assisting political and economic reform - Preventing regional conflict - Encourage regional cooperation
Sudan	2007-04-19 2005-07-18	2010-02-28 2007-04-30	T. Brylle (Denmark) P. Haavisto (Finland)	- Facilitate resolution of Darfur issue - Support implementation of CPA - Supporting AMIS and Chadian and CAR operations

Permanentaly terminated EUSRs

Focus	Start	End	EUSR	Past Mandate
South Eastern Europe	2001-12-19 1999-07-29 1999-05-31	Unclear 2001-12-18 1999-07-28*	E. Busek (Austria) B. Hombach (Germany) P. Roumeliotis (Greece)	- Assist the countries to develop a joint strategy for regional stability and growth according to the Stability Pact
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY)	1998-06-08	1999-10-11	F. González (Spain)	- Enhance effectiveness of EU's conflict resolution in FRY

Source: : Council of the European Union (2010)

Appendix V: EU and ESDP missions, 2003-2008

Mission acronym	Mission name	Start	End[ii]
EUPM	EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina	2003	ongoing
EUFOR Concordia	EU Military Operation in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	2003	2003
Operation Artemis	EU Military Operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo	2003	2003
EUPOL PROXIMA	EU Police Mission in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	2003	2005
EUJUST THEMIS	EU Rule of Law Mission in Georgia	2004	2005
EUFOR ALTHEA	EU Military Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina	2004	ongoing
EUPOL Kinshasa	EUPOL Police Mission in Kinshasa (DRC)	2005	2007
EUJUST LEX	EU Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq	2005	ongoing
EUSEC DR CONGO	EU Advisory and Assistance Mission for DRC Security Reform	2005	ongoing
AMM	EU Aceh Monitoring Mission	2005	2006
EU BAM Rafah	EU Border Assistance Mission for the Rafah Crossing Point	2005	ongoing
EUPAT	EU Police Advisory Team in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	2005	2006
EUPOL COPPS	EU Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories	2006	ongoing
EUFOR DR Congo	EUFOR DR Congo	2006	2006
EUPOL Afghanistan	EU Police Mission in Afghanistan	2007	ongoing
EUPOL RD Congo	EU Police Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo	2007	ongoing
EUFOR Tchad/RCA	EU Military Operation in Chad and Central African Republic	2008	ongoing
EULEX Kosovo	EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo	2008	ongoing
EU SSR Guinea-Bissau	EU Advisory Mission for Security Sector Reform in the Republic of Guinea-Bissau	2008	ongoing
EUMM	EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia	2008	ongoing

Source: SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database

ii Status as of the end of 2008; i.e., ongoing means that the mission was ongoing at that time.

Appendix VI: EU and OSCE sanctions targets, 1980-2008

Country	Start	End
Afghanistan*	1996-	1998
Argentina	1982-	1982
Armenia**	1992-	
Azerbaijan**	1992-	
Belarus	1998-	1999
	2002-	2003
	2006-	
Bosnia-Hercegovina	1996-	
Burma (Myanmar)	1991-	
China	1989-	
Croatia	1996-	2000
	2003-	
DRC	1993-	2002
Eritrea*	1998-	1998
Ethiopia*	1998-	1998
Georgia*	1993-	1993
Iran	1984-	1985
Iraq	1984-	1985
Indonesia	1999-	2000
Libya	1986-	1991
	2000-	
FYR Macedonia	1996-	
Moldova	2003-	
Nigeria	1993-	1999
Slovenia	1996-	1998
Sudan	1994-	2003
Syria	1986-	1994
Soviet Union	1982-	1982
Uzbekistan	2005-	
Yemen*	1994-	1994
Yugoslavia /Serbia-	1991-	1991
Montenegro /Serbia	1996-	
Zimbabwe	2002-	

* UN recommended sanctions, ** OSCE sanctions

Source: Kreutz (2005) – updated for this report (2009)

Appendix VII: EU consultations and suspension of aid, 1989-2005

Year	Consultation cases	Suspension cases
1990		Liberia, Sudan
1991		Central African Republic, Djibouti, Haiti, Kenya
1992		Equatorial Guinea, Togo
1993		Togo, Burundi
1994		Equatorial Guinea, Gambia, Rwanda
1996		Niger
1997		Burundi, Congo
1998	Togo	Guinea-Bissau
1999	Niger, Guinea-Bissau, Comoros	
2000	Cote d'Ivoire, Haiti, Fiji	
2001	Cote d'Ivoire, Liberia	Haiti, Liberia
2002	Zimbabwe	Zimbabwe
2003	Central African Republic	
2004	Togo, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea	
2005		Guinea

Source: Bartels (2008)

Appendix VIII: Research design and data sources, "Have EU measures succeeded?"

Dependent variables

The statistical analysis performed in this report is presented in three tables. In the first, the dependent variable is whether a civil war was terminated in a country in a given year. As data on armed conflict is drawn from the UCDP/PRIO dataset on armed conflict, which identifies conflict as the armed struggle over a specified incompatibility, a country can experience multiple conflicts simultaneously. In Ethiopia, for example, fighting ended in the conflict over Oromiya in 1995, but continued throughout 1996 in the Ogaden conflict. Data indicating the termination of a conflict is taken from the UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset and does not exclude any particular type of outcome: victories, peace agreements, or simply a cessation of hostilities (Kreutz 2010). For a conflict to be considered terminated, it is followed by at least one year of no conflict activity as specified by the definition of armed conflict.

In the second table, the dependent variable is the signing of a peace agreement in a conflict. Even though the popular conception is that peace agreements are signed at the end of a conflict, there are numerous exceptions. Peace agreements can be signed but fail early on in the implementation phase, thus not providing an actual termination of conflict activity. In other instances, peace agreements are signed several years, or maybe even decades after the fighting ceased. Information on the signing of (at least one) peace agreement in a country in a given year is extracted from the UCDP Peace Agreements Dataset (Harbom, Högbladh & Wallensteen 2006).

In the third table, several different indicators of good governance and severe human rights violations are explored. Data on coup attempts is taken from an ongoing data collection effort by the UCDP, headed by Magnus Öberg. Data on democratization is the calculated change in the Polity IV score of the regime type of a country. The Polity project is widely used as a measure of regime characteristics and its scale ranges from -10 (complete autocracy) to +10 (complete democracy) (Marshall & Jaggers 2002). Data on the onset of a civil war in a country is taken from the UCDP/PRIO armed conflict dataset. Finally, the two final models indicate whether deliberate attacks on civilians occur in a country (Eck & Hultman 2007). Model 4 investigates specifically whether government actors attack civilians, and model 5 whether any actor (including the government, potential rebels or terrorists) attack civilians in a given year.

Independent variables

The independent variables are collected specifically for this report. In the first two tables, dichotomous variables indicating the following is included: if any EU member states was involved as a secondary warring or supporting party in a conflict, if the EU was involved as a third party in a conflict, if the EU has any type of sanctions in place targeting actors in a country, or whether the EU had an appointed special representative to the country or the region. In the third table, indications of sanctions and special representatives are accompanied by a variable depicting whether the EU has any agreement with human rights conditionality clause with the country, and whether the EU suspended aid to the country. As it was not possible to reliably confirm the

duration aid was suspended, this variable only indicates the year when this measure was imposed.

Control variables

As the statistical exercise is not theory-driven, it becomes difficult to identify suitable control variables. However, some measures can be expected to influence both the dependent and independent variables throughout this analysis. This includes the economic development of the country, measured as GDP per capita. This data is taken from the World Bank development indicators and is measured in current (2009) US $. It may also be necessary to control for the regime type of the country. Recent research has identified some problems with the Polity IV measure when studying the onset of political violence. In particular, it is possible that using the composite Polity IV scale on regime types may overestimate the propensity of war in anocracies (Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland 2009). Therefore, to control for the regime type, the executive constraints (xconst) measure from the Polity IV dataset is included and lagged one year (Marshall and Jaggers 2002). This component has been shown to be the main driver for most of the variation of the Polity score used in previous studies, while it is not influenced by the presence of political violence.

The final control variables are included to control for the possibility that EU policy have a greater impact in different regions, or that the development of the EU capability and ambitions have led to an increased impact over time. This is measured by including dummy variables for countries in Europe and Africa, as well as the year of each observation.

Research design

As the dependent variable in all models is a dichotomous variable, a logit regression technique is appropriate. The unit of analysis is the country-year, and the dataset contains information from 174 different countries for the time period 1989-2008. To control for potential spatial effects, the models are clustered on country and robust standard errors are used. The results are robust for several alternative model specifications but, as mentioned in the report, this should still be treated as a tentative starting point for future analysis of EU activity.