
Codebook
for
Community and Consent

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INTRODUCTION

The monk-led unarmed insurrection in Burma (Myanmar) in the autumn of 2007 was unable to challenge the repressive regime. Yet, organised civilians populations elsewhere have successfully employed nonviolent methods in several social conflicts around the globe. Autocratic regimes were removed from power in Serbia (2000) and Georgia (2003) after rigged elections, a foreign occupation was ended in Lebanon (2005) and a monarch was forced to make major constitutional concessions in Nepal (2006) as a direct result of sustained and systematic nonviolent actions.

The above examples are all part of the dataset examined in the article ‘Community and consent: Unarmed insurrections in non-democracies’. The data builds and expands on the data on nonviolent campaigns (unarmed insurrections) in the dataset of Nonviolent and Violent Conflicts and Outcomes (NAVCO 1.0) (Chenoweth and Stephan 2008). For the particular purpose of ‘Community and consent: Unarmed insurrections in non-democracies’, the data focuses on unarmed insurrections in non-democracies and their objectives in terms of concerning issues relating to governmental matters, territorial control or occupation.

This codebook briefly presents the content of the dataset, presenting the variables and their definitions and operationalisations.

UNARMED INSURRECTIONS

Unarmed Insurrections are nonviolent campaigns in which often broad and diverse social movements apply nonviolent methods, such as protests, strikes, boycotts and parallel governmental systems, in a systematic and strategic manner, to challenge their regimes.¹ The objectives of unarmed insurrections, as perceived in this project, concern governmental issues (ideology, administration and leadership, constitutional issues, power sharing etc); territorial issues (self-determination, autonomy, independence and secession) or occupation (forcefully occupied countries/land/ territories by neighbours or colonial powers). This implies that other typical examples of nonviolent campaigns such as the rights movement under Martin Luther King or that under the leadership of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, are not included in the concept here. Another important feature of the studied unarmed insurrections is the broad array of nonviolent tactics they apply. The variety of actions covers all of Gene Sharp’s clusters: 1) nonviolent protest and persuasion (mock elections, symbolic public acts, marches, demonstrations, walk-outs etc), 2) social, political or economic noncooperation (boycotts, strikes, rent and tax withholding, nonobedience etc), and 3) nonviolent interventions (hunger strike, nonviolent occupation, stay-in strikes, dual sovereignty and parallel government etc) (Sharp 1973; Sharp 2005).

Previous research often refers to nonviolent action in general terms such as ‘nonviolence’, ‘non-violent social movements’ or ‘nonviolent campaigns’, and ‘people power’. We however follow the example of Zunes (1994) and Schock (2005) and refer to unarmed

¹ According to Schock, unarmed insurrections are ‘...organised popular challenges to government authority that depend primarily on methods of nonviolent action rather than on armed methods.’ (2005:xvi). Other labels for nonviolent campaigns include, among others, ‘people power’, ‘nonviolent uprisings’, ‘nonviolence’, ‘strategic nonviolent action’, ‘satyagraha’ (coined by Mahatma Gandhi) etc.

insurrections, as this in essence has the same meaning but provides a somewhat more confined scope of definition. According to Schock, unarmed insurrections are ‘organised popular challenges to government authority that depend primarily on methods of nonviolent action rather than on armed methods’ (Schock, 2005: xvi). For an extended conceptual discussion, see Schock (2005: 7–8).

CONSTRUCTION OF THE DATASET

The dataset is based on parts of the already existing dataset, Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes (NAVCO 1.0) (Chenoweth and Stephan 2008). NAVCO includes consensus data on both armed and unarmed (nonviolent) campaigns during 1900-2006. In the first step of constructing the Community and Consent data set, all nonviolent campaigns during 1946-2006, numbering 76, were extracted from NAVCO.

Whereas the original unit of analysis in NAVCO is conflict peak year (one observation for each campaign), the unit of analysis of our data set is disaggregated to conflict country year.² The duration of, and thus the number of observations per each nonviolent campaign, is determined according to start and end dates as specified in NAVCO (Chenoweth 2008). Most campaigns are coded for one year; Hungary 1989, Nepal 2006, Greece 1974, and Senegal 2000. Some campaigns are active for several years; Mexico 1987-2000, Poland 1981-1989, Yugoslavia (Kosovo) 1989-1999, and West Papua 1970-2006. Information for new years, not coded in NAVCO, are updated based on information in consensus data and news articles, in line with NAVCO specifications (Chenoweth 2008).

Because the article studies non-democracies, the data set accordingly excludes democratic countries with unarmed insurrections. According to POLITY’s official standards for categorisation, we define countries as fully democratic when all years of unarmed insurrection have a POLITY score from +6 to +10. These cases are here excluded in the data set. Our sample includes cases that, for at least one of their active years, are either coded as an autocracy (–10 to –6) or an anocracy (–5 to +5) according to POLITY standards.

The NAVCO dataset includes information on multiple variables (Chenoweth 2008), of which we use—as well as have added information for new years to—the following:

- (1) campaign outcomes (full success, limited success, failure)
- (2) democracy level (POLITY)
- (3) Cold War (dummy variable)

We have collected data on and added the following new variables to our dataset:

- (1) conflict objectives (gov, terr, occ)
- (2) conflict duration (years)
- (3) conflict intensity (dummy for war)
- (4) country income (GDP per capita)

² If a campaign lasted for more than one year, Chenoweth and Stephan determine the peak year of the campaign by 1) the year in which the most members participated, 2) if membership information is missing, the peak year is coded for the year of success or failure, and 3) the year the campaign ended due to suppression or dispersion of the campaign (Chenoweth 2008:4; Chenoweth and Stephan 2008:16).

- (5) strength of the unarmed insurrection (weak, moderate, strong)
- (6) previous experiences of unarmed insurrections (dummy)

OPERATIONAL DESCRIPTION OF THE MAIN VARIABLES

This section presents and discusses some of the main—but not all—variables of the dataset. For a full overview of all variables of the dataset, please refer to the table under ‘Variable Overview’ below.

Conflict Objective

Conflict objectives are determined based on the descriptive information on target of the unarmed insurrection in NAVCO, concerning 1) target and 2) campaign. The variable is separated into three dummy variables for objectives concerning 1) government, 2) territory or 3) occupation. All variables are mutually exclusive. Governmental conflicts are those regarding leadership, political administration, electoral or constitutional issues, or ideologically motivated disputes. Ousting autocratic leaders is one of the most common governmental objectives in the dataset. Territorial conflicts are all those concerning self-determination issues such as autonomy, self-rule or independence. East Timor, Kosovo and West Papua are all examples of these conflicts. Finally, the third dummy variable codes conflicts where occupied territories are contested. These cases are few during the period, as most colonial unarmed insurrections take place in the 1950s and 1960s. However, some of the cases in this category includes by Syria occupied Lebanon in 2005, the First Intifada between Israel and Palestine 1987-1991, the Druze resistance against Israeli occupation of Syrian territory, the unarmed insurrections against colonial rulers in Ghana (1951–7) and Zambia (1961–3) and against neighbouring aggressors in Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968).

Ethnic Identity

Ethnic identity is measured in a dummy variable, which is coded as 1 if the identity of either the dominant group of the unarmed insurrection or the government has a distinct ethnic feature. This variable is coded based on encyclopaedic entries on the various cases (Anderson and Herr, 2007; Carter et al., 2006; Powers and Vogeleson, 2006).

Ethnic Polarisation

The ethnic polarization (ETHPOL) of a society is measured based on data of Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005a, 2005b). The data departs from a strictly biological definition of ethnicity and operationalizes ethnic distance as cultural diversity (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005a: 295; 2005b: 796). Ethnic fractionalization commonly measures the probability of two randomly selected individuals of a country belonging to different ethno-linguistic groups (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005a: 300). Specifically, ethnic polarization is an index of societal tensions that measures ‘the normalized distance of a particular distribution of ethnic and religious groups from a bimodal distribution’ (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005a: 301f).

In this dataset, the variable misses information on a total of 30 years of unarmed insurrections

for the countries of Albania, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Mongolia, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and the Soviet Union/ Russia.

Outcomes

Three dichotomous outcome variables show what sort of effect the unarmed insurrections had in the short term, how they fulfilled their goals. We strictly depart from Chenoweth and Stephan's categorisation of the outcomes of unarmed insurrections (full and limited success and failure), which in turn is based on extensive literature reviews and dialogue with experts in the field. The variables originate from NAVCO, but are modified in our data set to include an outcome measure for each included year of unarmed insurrection. This means that all years where the unarmed insurrection does not fulfill any of their stated goals, is now coded as "1" for the variable *failure*. Some new limited successes are added to the cases, while the full success variable is the same as in NAVCO.

Duration

The variable is measured in years and counts the first year of unarmed insurrection as "0". The following, second year measures "1", while the third equals "2", fourth equals "3" and so on. By doing this, we control for that the number of preceding years of current year of unarmed insurrection. We do not use the duration measure of Chenoweth and Stephan, which are measured in days from the start of the conflict, as these measures are relatively ad hoc in dates and as we have conflict country years as our unit of analysis.

Democracy Level

The data set measures the democracy level according to the POLITY IV Project standards (Jagers and Marshall 2007), and interpolates transition period values (-88), codes foreign occupation years (-66) and interruptions (-77) as missing, i.e. leave these observations blank. POLITY ranges from -10 to +10, but as the dataset focuses to democracies, the included cases have POLITY scores that range from -10 to +5.

Strength of the Unarmed Insurrection

In line with Freedom House definitions, our data set measures the strength of the social mobilisation of the unarmed insurrection. For cases not included in the Freedom House dataset (on processes of democratisation), encyclopaedic entries and Factiva articles have been studied and analysed, and then coded according to three categories pre-defined by Ackerman and Karatnycky (2005) as:

“Strong—refers to the presence of a powerful, cohesive leading civic umbrella coalition that adheres to nonviolent forums for civic resistance.”

“Moderate—refers to civic forces that have considerable membership strength, but whose influence is weakened by a) a lack of unity represented by multiple groupings rather than a single broad-based coalition; b) the presence of rival civic forces that rejected nonviolent action and employ violent force in their struggle; c) settings in which there are some active civic groupings, but these groupings do not have significant mass membership support.”

“*Weak* (or absent)—refers to a weak civic infrastructure, the absence of a significant civic coalition and the absence of even modest mass support.”

In the occasion of lack of information on the strength of a movement for a certain year, the observation is left empty.

Cold War

Measured as a dummy, the structural impact of the Cold War dynamics can be controlled for in the variable CW. This variable measures 1 from 1970 until 1991, after which it is denoted as a 0.

VARIABLE OVERVIEW

In the table below, all variables of the Community and Consent data set are presented in brief.

Variable	Explanation
RegionID	1 – Africa 2 – Asia 3 – Americas 4 – Europe 5 – Middle East
Region	Name of the Region
CountryID	57 countries in total
Country	Name of country in which the unarmed insurrection is based and the conflict takes place.
CampaignID	Each campaign has its own identification number.
Campaign	Name of the movement/s of the unarmed insurrection or other specification where available. Descriptive.
Year	Year of activity
GOV	Issues on governance, constitution, power-sharing, ideology etc. 1 = governmental objective 0 = other objectives
TERR	Self-determination issues 1 = territorial objective 0 = other objectives
OCC	Occupied lands/territories 1 = objectives over occupied territories 0 = other objectives
ETHID	1 = distinct ethnic feature of either unarmed insurrection or government 0 = no ethnic features in conflict actors
ETHPOL	A continuous variable ranging from 0 to 1, measured on the country level. For more on the construction of the variable, see Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005a, 2005b).
SECC	Secessionist demands in territorial conflicts
AUT	Autonomy demands in territorial conflicts
SUCC	1 = Either full or limited success.

	0 = other outcome of still ongoing
FULLSUCC	1 = Full success. All stated goals of the unarmed insurrection fulfilled. 0 = other outcome or still ongoing
LIMSUCC	1 = Limited success. Some of the stated goals of the unarmed insurrection fulfilled. 0 = other outcome or still ongoing
FAIL	1 = Suppressed by the regime, dispersed or petered out. No goals fulfilled. 0 = other outcome or still ongoing
DUR	Conflict duration measured in years. Starts with "0" for the first year, "1" for the second, "2" for the third etc.
POLITY	Annual POLITY IV scores (Jaggers and Marshall 2007), from -10 to +5 representing non-democracies.
GDPpercapita	Annual GDP per capita data, in current US dollars. <i>Source:</i> Alan Heston, Robert Summers and Bettina Aten, Penn World Table Version 6.2, Center for International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the University of Pennsylvania, September 2006. http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt62/pwt62_form.php
CW	1 = when the year of the unarmed insurrection takes place during the Cold War (1970-1990) 0 = otherwise (1991-2006)
STRENGTH	0 = Weak 1 = Moderate 2 = Strong Empty cells represent missing data.
WAR	Intra-state armed conflict during year of unarmed insurrection. Data from Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Database.

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